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ABSTRACT 
 Jose Martí compels historical interest for various 
reasons.  Foremost, Cubans recognize Martí as the "Apostle" 
of Independence.  In 1895 he died in combat at the age of 
forty-two.  During his short lifetime, Martí contributed 
immensely to the corpus of Latin American literature and 
political thought.  However, Martí is primarily honored for 
single-handedly organizing the revolution in which he 
perished. 
 Martí's passage to war, speaking geographically from 
where he began to where he landed, should have been a 
journey of no great challenge.  It deserved no more press 
than it received.  But as a snapshot in Martí’s life his 
eleven-day journey appears intriguingly under-developed.  
Historians routinely cite Martí’s departure from 
Montecristi, Dominican Republic, on 1 April 1895, and his 
eventual arrival in Cuba on 11 April 1895, as if, quite 
honestly, they have never looked at a map.  From either 
Inagua or Hispaniola (islands in the Caribbean), Martí’s 
destination, Cuba, was but a mere forty-six miles.  Indeed, 
concerning his journey, history reflects only brief 
descriptions about Martí overcoming improbable odds or, even 
less than that, a wisp of dated facts. Therein lies a story.
 The methodology for telling this story rests on primary 
sources.  The story, through comparative analysis, 
challenges and seeks to clarify secondary sources. 
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 Martí’s untold story is, of course, multidimensional.  
Therefore, there are chapters about Martí’s life; Cuba's 
revolutionary history; the United States' one-sided posture 
toward Cuba (as early as the first decade during the 
nineteenth century); Martí’s compatriots; Spanish rule; and, 
yachts and ships and starting and stopping.  It is an 
exciting and bizarre story and one with a happy ending.  It 
is also true.  And, it is a tale from which a legend 
emerged. 
 What originally attracted my interest in Martí’s story 
arises from professional experiences as a United States' 
Licensed Ship Captain (Master of one hundred gross tons, 
sailing and towing endorsements, since 1991).  Personal 
offshore-sea experiences happen to include all the specific 
areas referenced in the primary and secondary sources 
covering Martí’s passage (including Cuba). 
In historical context Martí’s sea-wise hurdles--
concerning port of departure to port of arrival--seemed 
exaggerated.  Therein existed the seed from which grew the 
logical conclusion that there was more to the story than 
initially reported.  Furthermore, those readings piqued my 
curiosity because of their authors’ off-handed depiction of 
a captain's implicit loyalty to ship and crew in contrast 
with transporting armed insurgents into dangerous 
situations.  For not only was the vessel and crew at risk 
from the "friendly" governments into whose territories they 
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sailed, but also anxiety had to abound surrounding the on-
board presence of armed insurgents. 
 In addition to my experiences at sea, there are also my 
rather unique experiences from the opposite side from 
revolution--having been a two-term elected city commissioner 
in Dunedin, Florida (1987-1992).  Whereby, in the small 
context that it was, I learned to have special appreciation 
for civil decorum in the midst of change.  In addition to 
those real life experiences are also those from owning and 
operating a multinational business (1979-1991). 
 Aside from Martí’s story, which begs to be told, is 
that my qualifications impelled me to be the one to attempt 
it.  On the one hand, Martí’s story satisfies thesis 
requirements for a Master's Degree in History.  But, I also 
bring to the subject the talent to tell a good story.  This 
I credit to a Bachelor of Arts Degree in English from 
Indiana University (Bloomington, 1976).  Important also is a 
Master's Degree in Business Administration from the 
University of South Florida (Tampa, 1997).  The former 
polishes my palate for appreciating and telling the story 
while the latter bears upon the material and theoretical 
understanding of what motivates societies. 
The title to this story did not develop in a vacuum.  
On 25 March 1889, Martí’s letter to the editor of the New 
York Evening Post defended Cuban patriots of the Ten Years' 
War (1868-1878).  His letter delineated specifically the 
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Cuban patriots' resolve, which included examples of them 
overcoming nearly unbearable hardships.  Among the examples 
rested especially Cubans’ resolve to engage war in the first 
place with Spain, an overwhelming foe.  Martí, in response 
to “weak Cuban character,” disdainfully expressed to the 
editor that the patriots "knew in one day how to rise 
against a cruel government, to pay their passages to the 
seat of war with the pawning of their watches and trinkets." 
With that same kind of fervent resolve--a feeling drawn from 
the few historical snippets of his passage to war--Jose 
Martí persisted.  Thesis or not, Martí’s story has merit.  
He was a great American. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 1 April 1895 is a memorable day in the chronicle of 
Revolutionary lore for Cuban Independence.  That day Jose 
Martí--"the Apostle of Cuban Independence"1--sailed from 
the shores of the Dominican Republic to join the revolution 
in Cuba, already underway.  The direct distance between the 
two points was 137 miles.  Five others sailed with Martí.  
Thus began, for that party of six, an eleven-day journey 
fraught with bungling, deception, treachery, and 
sightseeing. 
 Ironically, this historic incident eventually became 
preserved as legendary in a country's proud history, 
something not unusual in American history.  Consider, for 
example, George Washington's passage across the Delaware 
River in 1776, which inspired hope for an eventually 
successful outcome in the American Revolution.  Looking 
closely at that portentous hour in American history, one 
has to note uncomfortably that Washington's passage did not 
occur on just any randomly cold, wintry night, but on 
Christmas Eve.  Note also that the Christian forefathers' 
passage across the river did not have the holy intention to 
pray for peace or such forgiveness with a likewise 
Christian enemy; nor did it even attempt to share in the 
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spirit of fellowship and merriment with the enemy caught 
sipping warm grog and, quite literally, with their pants 
down.  That such an ironic American foray--eventually 
esteemed and reverently enshrined by the American artist 
Luetze in oils, on canvas, and framed2--should be eminently 
on its way into American memory is really not that 
uncommon. 
Renown for all sorts of oddities with twisted or 
forgotten facts is frequently inscribed by nations able to 
write their own history.  A curiously blurred line exists 
between the reality and the myth of a nation's history.  
Crane Brinton, an historical scholar on the subject of 
revolutions, expanded on this anomaly in his 1935 treatise, 
The Anatomy of Revolution: 
  
 Insofar as the memory of a revolution is actually 
incorporated in human emotions its real and 
abiding significance may well be the 
statistically false, or unreal, form it takes in 
such emotions, and in the moral stimulus--or 
solace--it provides.  In one way or another, 
perhaps, all great revolutions end up in the 
custody of something like the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, or the Legion d'Honneur, or 
the Istorik Marksist.  The legend is the fact, 
forever safe from the naivetes of the debunker.3 
This passage does not indicate that artistic symbolism 
in history is worthless.  Artistic symbolism more 
passionately reflects facts than any other to trust 
conveying the pathos of an historical event.  Empathy for 
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the merit of the moment becomes lost without it.  History 
then would have no more appeal than a string of 
mathematical equations.  Martí’s story indeed has pathos. 
 And the Cuban Revolution also has a Washingtonian 
symbol.  An immortalizing portrait of Jose Martí hangs in 
the Cuban National Museum in Havana.  He is portrayed 
rowing his heart out in a tumultuous sea off the shoreline 
of Cuba--dressed in a suit.  Yet, one gleans segments from 
the overall historical significance behind that portrait 
that are relevant to this story.  The most obvious arises 
from the adage that a picture is worth a thousand words, 
which normally it is.  In this case, the story merits about 
thirty thousand. 
 This work will explore the unadorned facts of a 
remarkable saga.  1 April 1895--a day ironically regarded 
in the larger scope of Western history as April Fools' 
Day4--Cuba's legendary conquerors for Cuban Independence 
embarked as fare-paying passengers on an eleven-day passage 
to Cuba in a schooner prophetically named Brothers. 
 Other than a moderate amount of historical puffing to 
celebrate their arrival in Cuba, few instances of factual 
inaccuracy appear regarding the journey of these six men.  
In fact, what compels interest in the story is the absence 
of serious historical compilation.  Their journey is a 
missing chapter in the history of the Revolution.  It all 
but speaks out to be told.  Not unlike Pirandello's, Six 
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Characters in Search of an Author5, from omission is a 
special opportunity to develop into an historical story an 
event of mythical proportion. 
 History is a scrapbook of pictorial flashbacks, each a 
story in itself.  The historian's arrangement is 
discretionary and often defies chronological order to 
achieve the best elucidation.  In that vein, the mosaic of 
Martí’s passage will intersperse biographies and national 
histories. 
 Martí and his retinue's passage aboard the Brothers to 
invade Cuba compelled initial curiosity because it did not 
consist of a direct sail to the Cuban shore.  His party’s 
journey began from Montecristi in the Dominican Republic.  
The simplest option would have been either to trek directly 
west seventy miles across Haiti, or sail along its 
shoreline, and then span the mere forty-five-or-so miles to 
Cuba.  Instead, they charted a northerly roundabout course 
through the Bahamas.  It was, however, a course, which, to 
say the least, would have discouraged even the most dogged 
Spanish trackers. 
 Their strategy appears logical.  They sailed almost 
due northwest about 137 miles to Inagua, an island located 
in the Bahamas about forty-five miles northeast of the 
eastern tip of Cuba.  The insurgents likely assumed the 
Spanish would least suspect an invasion from the Bahama 
Channel (from the British Bahamas) rather than the Windward 
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Passage (from Independent Haiti).  In Haiti, the Spanish 
knew quite well there sat a hostile government, which less 
than one hundred years earlier had won its independence 
from France in a bloody uprising.6  The revolutionaries' 
logic was also undoubtedly complemented with the knowledge 
that the Dominican Republic still harbored bellicose 
feelings toward Spain--for the Dominican Republic had won 
its independence from Spain in 1821.7 
 But in Inagua, quite to their surprise, the captain 
and crew of the Brothers left the revolutionaries 
stranded.8  That was the first domino to fall.  Over the 
next ten days the intrepid-sixes' invasion took on even 
more ironic proportions. 
After four days of rigmarole in Inagua, where they 
were unwelcome, the insurgents negotiated a high-priced 
ride aboard a fruit ship bound for Cape Haitian.  But, 
instead of bending forty-six miles south and skirting the 
Cuban coastline so Martí’s party could hop off, the 
Nordstrand beelined 115 miles for Haiti.  Once again, the 
rebels were back on the island of Hispaniola, only thirty-
six miles west of their beginning point.  There, they 
killed time for four days. 
On April 10, again aboard the Nordstrand, they 
embarked.  Did their course sweep westerly 120 miles toward 
Cuba?  No.  The Nordstrand backtracked--straight to Inagua.  
Apparently, for the rebels, a moment of clarity blossomed.  
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Martí bought a rowboat for 100 pesos.  It not only conveyed 
the party to Cuba but also provided incredible excitement. 
On the afternoon of 11 April, with the revolutionaries 
and their Navy One on board, the Nordstrand steamed for 
Jamaica.  In less than two hours, Cuba was in sight.  And, 
as the Nordstrand steamed, so came they upon Cuba and the 
night upon them.  On a darker than usual night, several 
miles from Cuba’s eastern most shore, the Nordstrand hove 
to and lowered Navy One into a simmering sea fueled by a 
looming storm.  The revolutionaries’ sea skills were tested 
immediately.  Chaos followed.  Lost were their visibility, 
direction, rudder, oars, and tempers.9 
It is understandable why key historians perceived 
Martí’s passage as divine.  For over eleven days the 
insurgents logged almost four times the distance from where 
they began on 1 April and the La Playita shoreline where 
the hapless rowboat scuttled in the wee hours of 12 April.10   
Regardless of the approach from either of the two 
islands (Hispaniola or Inagua), the distance was at most a 
mere fifty miles.  For such an interesting and puzzling 
journey to have received such scant attention from students 
of the Cuban Revolution, amounting from a sentence to a 
paragraph is, in itself, astounding.11  After all, at the 
very least, the passage included, besides Jose Martí, 
another Cuban Revolutionary of significant historical 
stature, Maximo Gomez. 
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 Fortunately, Martí and Gomez have left us their 
diaries.  Supplementing the diaries are such chronicles as 
the United States' records of Documented Vessels; Lloyd's 
Register of Ships; and, Custom and Consul records from Key 
West, Matthew Town (Inagua, Bahamas), Cape Haitian, and 
Montecristi.  Also, contemporary newspaper accounts--by-
products of a notorious time in journalism--shed light on 
the event.12  Finally, numerous history books and journal 
articles discuss the passage; each, apparently, condensed 
versions of the two diaries. 
Martí and Gomez were two of three heroes of legendary 
proportion to emerge from the Cuban Revolution of 1895.  
The third, incidentally, was Antonio Maceo, already engaged 
militarily in Cuba--but, by just one day--before Martí and 
Gomez set sail on 1 April.13 
Maceo's invasion was no less bizarre than Martí’s and 
Gomez's.  It was, however, considerably more direct, did 
not take as much time, and certainly did not include as 
much diplomacy.  In that vein, Maceo's passage bears an 
easy summary. 
 Antonio Maceo intended to invade Cuba from Costa Rica 
aboard the steam ship, Adirondack, which was supposed to 
land him and twenty-two others in Cuba in March 1895.  But, 
on 29 March, the captain "broke his promise" and 
"deposited" them 130 miles north of Cuba, in the Bahamas, 
on tiny, nondescript, Fortune Island.14  Maceo and his band 
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"prevailed" to charter a sailboat.  They sailed due south, 
through a storm and right past Inagua, where, of course, in 
two days the Martí and Gomez invasion would begin to 
unravel.  Finally, Maceo invaded near Baracoa on 31 March 
when the unlucky vessel crashed into the rocky shoreline--
after one of his brigands "accidentally" killed the 
captain.15 
 The Cuban Revolution was planned to begin on 24 
February 1895 in honor of an arguably failed Revolution 
known as the Ten Years' War, which occurred between 1868 
and 1878.  The Revolution of 1895, in fact, started on 
time.16  But all three of Cuba's legendary heroes--Martí, 
Gomez, and Maceo--arrived on the backside of the wave, more 
than a month late.  It was not, of course, their intention. 
 For bad luck had already preceded.  On 14 January a 
well-conceived and grand plan had simply gone interestingly 
and wildly awry.  At Fernandina, Florida, the United States 
government impounded three chartered steam ships, the 
Baracoa, Lagonda, and Amadis.  Each ship had intended to 
head in a different direction, and each was loaded with 
arms, ammunition, and men.17  So influential was this 
botched plan to Martí and Gomez's passage, as well as to 
Maceo's, that it will be discussed in greater depth later.  
Likewise important are facts about the Ten Years' War where 
Maceo and Gomez emerged as celebrities despite apparent 
defeat. 
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 Martí, however, garnered no fame from the Ten Years' 
War.  At its outbreak, he was only fifteen and not a 
revolutionary, but a student of literature.  Yet his 
contribution to the War paled in comparison to the 
contribution it made to his growth and thought processes.  
As a result of coincidental involvement he was deported to 
Spain in 1871.  He attended the University of Saragossa and 
earned degrees in law and philosophy in 1874. 
Martí lived abroad, in Spain and elsewhere, for all 
but two of his ensuing twenty-one years.  Ironically, his 
years abroad proved important to the successful outcome of 
the Revolution of 1895 and, thus, merit a broader look.  
Also, the Ten Years' War and the Fernandina debacle were 
important in bringing about the passage of the intrepid-six 
on 1 April--and in establishing Jose Martí’s fame.18 
 Martí raised many eyebrows among his constituency when 
it became known he intended to rush head long into Cuba and 
onto the scene of war.  He was the most productive 
revolutionary minister of 1895, and, as such, was safe from 
harm living abroad.19  Speculation throughout the years has 
coalesced around several reasons he may have decided to go.  
Not the least of these reasons centered upon Martí’s own 
self-reflection, stung by accusations from within his own 
cadre, of reluctance to go where blood and grime meets 
dreams.20 
Courage was not Martí’s motive at all.  His powerful 
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pen thundered Herculean strength in a letter to the editor 
of the New York Evening Post of 25 March 1889.  Martí, in a 
heart-wrenching defense, fended off criticism about the 
mettle of the Cuban people; their worthiness, and, to him, 
the abhorrent prospect of Cuba's annexation by the United 
States.21  In a masterpiece of prose, Martí utilized the 
opportunity to counter a previous editorial's allusions and 
direct references despicably aimed at the Cubans' inability 
to drive out Spain and, in particular, to the editorial's 
disparaging comments toward the Patriots of the Ten Years' 
War.  Martí railed: 
 
 Because our halfbreeds and city-bred young men 
are generally of delicate physique, of suave 
courtesy, and ready words, hiding under the glove 
that polishes the poem the hand that fells the 
foe--are we to be considered as the [editorial] 
does consider us, an ‘effeminate’ people?  These 
city-bred young men and poorly built halfbreeds 
knew in one day how to rise against a cruel 
government, to pay their passages to the seat of 
war with the pawning of their watches and 
trinkets, to work their way in exile while their 
vessels were being kept from them by the country 
of the free in the interest of the foes of 
freedom, to obey as soldiers, sleep in the mud, 
eat roots, fight ten years without salary, 
conquer foes with the branch of a tree, die22 
 Martí died on 19 May 1895, a mere five weeks after 
arriving in Cuba.  As if Martí’s own "passage to the seat 
of war" was not enigmatic enough, mystery surrounds his 
death.  No less than four accounts exist in newspapers and 
in Cuban and American history books.23  Among the theories 
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no definitive evidence supports that Martí was on a suicide 
mission, presaging martyrdom, whereby he sacrificed himself 
into an impetus for Cuban success.24  Nor does evidence 
support a theory that Martí was set-up for slaughter in the 
ambush that took his life.25  All of the accounts' facts and 
theories do, however, support the conclusion that Jose 
Martí’s death stemmed from bad timing.  Martí was in the 
wrong place at the wrong time.  Martí, the man, was not a 
legend when he died.  Yet his death ignited a flame of 
unprecedented proportion in the Revolution: a flame that, 
indeed, lasts to this day. 
 Martí’s only combat involvement was the instance in 
which he died.  Preceding that was his incredible eleven-
day passage to arrive at his fateful moment.  His passage 
to war comprised approximately twenty-percent of his total 
paramilitary involvement and, thus, deserves inclusion 
among the histories involving this celebrated Cuban 
patriot. 
Among early twentieth-century historical accounts of 
the Cuban Revolution, Jose Martí, though not obscure, was 
not front-and-center as other patriots.  Increased 
scholarly interest concerning Martí during the latter half 
of the twentieth-century has, however, borne out his 
contribution as fundamental to the Cuban Revolution, and, 
as such, his fame has multiplied and become as secure in 
legend as it seems deserved in fact. 
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 Among the remarkable facts surrounding this worldly 
man are that his acumen has notably augmented such 
disciplines as social science, literature, and politics.  
It seems, therefore, appropriate to add a more complete 
rendition of the events of this fateful eleven-day slice 
from Jose Martí’s profound, yet short, forty-two-year life.  
The time has now come to consider more fully Jose Martí’s 
epoch passage that, in the larger picture of Cuban 
independence, proved a Delaware-type crossing.  So, debunk 
as it may--in the same vein America cites George Washington 
as "the father of our Country"--Jose Martí’s paternal, 
apostolic, expedition set sail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CUBA’S REVOLUTIONARY LAUREATE 
Jose Martí did not foresee his death when he sailed 
from Montecristi for Cuba on 1 April 1895.  Martí was the 
consummate optimist.  Today, sorrow surrounds the memory 
and legend of Martí because of his tragic death on 19 May 
1895, while in the prime of life.  Martí, forty-two at the 
time of his death, had accomplished much.  Consequently, 
there is no mystery why speculation about deeds-undone 
should draw attention nearly equal to those of deeds-done.  
In 1927, Charles Chapman, a first-rate American historian, 
set the tone about Jose Martí when he wrote: 
 Thus perished the acknowledged Father of Cuban 
Independence.  It seemed at the time like an 
irreparable loss, but it may well have been a 
fortunate, if lamentable, accident,--fortunate, 
because it gave the revolution the stimulant of a 
hero and a martyr,--fortunate possibly for the 
later republic and for Martí’s own fame, since it 
prevented him from risking his reputation in the 
whirlpool of partisan politics, leaving him as 
perhaps the one figure of the Independence era, 
concerning whom all Cubans can unite in 
expressions of love and praise.  And in the 
meantime the work he could have done was capably 
performed by Estrada Palma and his aides in New 
York. Martí’s real task, that of organizing and 
inspiring the revolution, was already 
accomplished.1 
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 Whether Martí had lived or died, certainly, from his 
diary, he did not express any doubt about the ultimate 
success of the Cuban Revolution of 1895, namely, the 
abolition of Spanish rule in Cuba.  Indeed, exhibiting 
little, if any, realism about what awaited him, Martí’s 
diary from 1 April 1895 reads like an advertisement for a 
Caribbean cruise.2 
 Not so, however, does General Maximo Gomez's diary 
from the same day read.3  Martí and Gomez's differences 
emerged distinctly in what they wrote.  Martí, a published 
poet and a renowned diplomat, departed toward war for the 
first time in his life.4  General Gomez, in contrast, was a 
crusty, sixty-year old, war-hardened pragmatist, who had 
survived decades of brutal and bloody combat.5  Gomez had 
for a very long time been on first name terms with death.  
For Martí there was no such familiarity.  Until 1 April 
Martí’s role in war and revolution had proved illusory and 
vicarious.  Before Martí’s departure with Gomez, his life 
consisted of offshore revolutionary party organizing, fund 
raising, writing, and political philosophizing--entirely, 
and safely, beyond the reach of bloody combat.  Gomez's and 
Martí’s diaries reflect much more than differing views of a 
journey.  Their diaries focus on the contrasts between the 
men themselves--one who preached revolution and the other 
who practiced it. 
 How did Jose Martí--a petite, educated, and dapperly 
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dressed man--become included in a revolutionary excursion 
for which he was, in fact, so obviously ill suited?  The 
answer has given rise to speculation among American 
historical scholars for over a century.6  Certainly, at 
birth Jose Martí did not seem likely to emerge as the 
"Apostle" and "Father" of Cuban Independence.  His life was 
anything but focused toward revolution.  And, were it not 
for a mere quirk of fate, Jose Julian Martí y Perez would 
have been born in Spain, instead of Havana, Cuba, on 28 
January 1853.  Jose Martí’s father and mother were 
Spaniards.7  Martí’s father, an official in the Spanish 
military, accepted Cuba as an assignment.8   
The Latin American historian, Manuel Pedro Gonzalez, 
over a half-century ago, credited Jose Martí as the unique 
link between the northern and southern parts of the Western 
Hemisphere, in so much that he made "the spiritual and 
intellectual values of the United States known throughout 
the Hispanic World."9  Yet, Gonzalez also pondered an 
historical enigma he felt was all too evident, "Jose Martí 
is practically unknown to the North American people."10  
Today, it is odd, if not ironic, that Jose Martí, a man of 
rare talent and fame, has much of his life awaiting 
analysis for more than a century after his death: "There is 
unfortunately as yet no first-class biography of Jose 
Martí."11  But, as potent testimony to the stature of the 
man, Martí’s deeds have loomed increasingly larger, much 
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larger, than his mortal life.  Thus one can piece together 
a viable sketch of Martí’s life from the numerous histories 
of Cuba's "Second War of Independence."12  
 Martí’s superior intellect did not go unrecognized nor 
undeveloped in his early years.  The precocious youth, 
through the kindness and guidance of his paternal 
godfather, attended the Municipal School for Boys in 
Havana.13  There he made the most of his early educational 
opportunities and, at the age of thirteen, gained 
acceptance into an elite private school, Colegio de San 
Pablo.  Its Director was Rafael Maria de Mendive, a poet 
and journalist dedicated to "'furthering the advancement 
and improvement of the society' in which he lived."14  In 
October of 1868, the authorities arrested Mendive and 
imprisoned him as an activist in the "Ten Years' War," 
arguably, Cuba's First War for Independence.15  Accordingly, 
Martí, at age fifteen, focused increasingly on the social 
and political issues of his day.  His life may well have 
turned on a simple expression of criticism, written in a 
private letter to a friend which fell into the wrong hands, 
about a fellow student who marched in a Spanish parade.  
Accounts about Martí, at age sixteen, have indicated no 
other reason for his arrest on 21 October 1869 and his 
subsequent sentence of six years at hard labor on 4 March 
1870.16 
Martí garnered no documentable fame during the Ten 
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Years' War in Cuba.  Over the years, however, his fame as a 
participant in the War has grown.17  Martí’s reputation in 
the War has rested largely on the premise that there was 
continuity between the Ten Years' War and the Revolution of 
1895.18  Jose Martí, himself, did not hesitate to capitalize 
on a continuity premise in speeches and writings while he 
organized the influential Cuban Revolutionary Party between 
1892 and 1895.  The formation of this critically important 
organization was Martí’s greatest revolutionary 
accomplishment.19  But, the fact remains, at the out-break 
of the Ten Years' War, Martí was only fifteen and not a 
revolutionary, but a student of literature.20  And Martí’s 
notable involvement in the First War apparently occurred 
more by accident than design. 
 Martí’s prison sentence proved a door-opener to a 
worldly education.  For six months he broke rocks in a 
stone quarry near Havana.  Then, through the influence and 
aid of his father, the authorities commuted his sentence.21  
Deported to Spain in January of 1871, he attended the 
Universities of Saragossa and Madrid, where he earned 
degrees in law and philosophy in October of 1874.22  From 
sledgehammer to quill, he accomplished these astounding 
feats before the age of twenty-two.  Martí’s involvement in 
Cuba in the Ten Years' War was, therefore, limited. 
 His actual involvement, however, pales when compared 
to what the War contributed toward his thought processes; 
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and, therefore, raises both a realistic connection with the 
First and Second War and a justification for Martí’s place 
in the First War's history.  Martí’s sole contribution 
(which also drew praise from the literati in Spain) was a 
seething expose of Spanish treatment of political prisoners 
in Cuba.23 
 Despite imprisonment, Martí, a young Cuban with 
Spanish roots, felt strongly about the island's 
relationship to Spain.  At the outset he advocated reform 
rather than independence and had a staunch commitment to 
Cuban autonomy.24  A turning point, however, occurred in 
November of 1871 when, without benefit of a trial, the 
Spanish authorities in Cuba executed eight medical students 
from Havana University, who, it seemed, had appeared 
innocently on the fringe of a political rally.25 
 Martí’s outrage at this atrocity did not help his 
reputation in Spain.  He emerged solidly and expressively 
in favor of an outright independent Cuban republic and for 
democracy in Spain itself.  Indeed, if any ambivalence had 
existed in Martí over three options for Cuba's fate which 
involved Spain--the status quo (with minor reform), 
autonomy (a major reform), or independence--that attitude 
disappeared.  Martí apparently never favored acquisition of 
Cuba by the United States.  In fact, while he lived in New 
York he adamantly opposed the United States' jockeying for 
territorial rights over Cuba. 
 22 
Martí, after graduating from the Universities in Spain 
in 1874, fled Spain for France and, eventually, headed for 
Mexico in 1875.26  Spain granted amnesty to the island's 
dissidents at the conclusion of the Ten Years' War in the 
Treaty of Zanjon in 1878.27  Martí, then married,28 returned 
to Cuba and became involved as an activist writing and 
speaking for Cuban independence.  He lived in Cuba less 
than two years, briefly teaching and practicing law, when 
the authorities deemed him a conspirator in a haphazardly 
launched revolt in August, 1879.29  Once again they deported 
Martí to Spain, leaving his wife and son behind in Cuba.30  
Martí’s deportation this time held no prospects for 
education or university work.  Rather, his destination was 
a Spanish prison.  Fortunately, he escaped through France 
to New York in January of 1880.31 
Jose Martí did not set foot on Cuban soil until 
fifteen years later when he and General Maximo Gomez landed 
on 11 April 1895.  Yet, this second exile allowed him the 
opportunity to travel in Europe and Latin America.  Martí 
performed consular duties for Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay in New York.32  Endowed with a remarkable ability 
to write, and versed in five languages, Martí quite often 
emerged on the edge and in the midst of social, political, 
and literary changes in Europe and South America during the 
late nineteenth-century.33  His experiences convinced him of 
the merits of national unity in Latin America among Spain's 
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former colonies and of the need to develop unified 
confederate states, which he passionately hoped would one 
day include Cuba and Puerto Rico.  Martí coined the term 
"Mother America" and "Our America" out of respect for the 
countries of Latin America.  Martí referred to the United 
States as the "Other America."34  He repeatedly advocated 
this theme of unity and nationalism in numerous speeches 
and writings, which, also, conveyed his passionate hope for 
independence, in spirit and fact, for Cuba. 
 Martí’s commitment to an independent Cuba rested on 
his belief that the United States, since Thomas Jefferson's 
time, had positioned itself to acquire, one way or another, 
the island from Spain.35  Tying together the United States' 
penchant for imperial expansion, its history of slavery and 
labor exploitation, and Spain's creaky empire, Martí 
espoused to all who listened and read that Cuba was at risk 
of forever continuing its economic hegemony and 
humanitarian subjugation merely under the name of another 
master if Cuba delayed in establishing its independence.36  
Martí also believed in a domino effect for the rest of 
Latin America if the United States acquired Cuba.  With 
this belief, armed with his extraordinary knowledge of 
history and economics and his remarkable ability to 
communicate, Martí began telling his fellow countrymen in 
poetry, journals, speeches and news articles of the fate 
which awaited them.37 
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 Martí did not go unnoticed by the surviving 
revolutionaries of Cuba's Ten Years' War.  Nor, to Martí’s 
credit, did they go unnoticed by him.  Thus he inspired a 
wealth of correspondence between himself and celebrated war 
heroes and others who shared his passion for an independent 
Cuba.  To Martí, they were true patriots.  To the ex-
revolutionaries of the Ten Years' War, Martí represented 
the next generation of fighters.  Inevitably, the movement 
for the second war for Cuban independence coalesced around 
Martí. 
Throughout the 1880s, the population of displaced 
Cubans within the United States, alone, grew to an 
estimated 80,000.38  They embraced each other, for the most 
part, and chose to live within Cuban émigré colonies.  For 
example, colonies in the United States existed in Key West, 
New York, Tampa, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, Boston, Ocala, 
and New Orleans; elsewhere, there were Cuban émigré 
colonies throughout the Caribbean (Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica), Central America, South America, and 
even Europe.39 
 In 1892, Martí, based in New York, founded, edited and 
was the primary journalist for the revolution-arousing 
Cuban émigré newspaper, Patria.40  As the voice of the 
revolution in the offing, Patria became the hub for 
circulating the philosophy of a revolution.  It was also 
the source for specific news of interest of the émigré 
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communities, and, in particular, their communities' quite 
diverse, yet, all-important, patriotic clubs.  Patria 
stimulated the growth of new clubs and consolidation of 
existing ones. 
 The clubs proved ideally and structurally suitable for 
unifying a democratic base within the colonies.  The clubs, 
by means of Patria, became superb mediums for expressing 
wholesale consensus of thought among Cubans.  Also, Patria, 
through applauding the successes of specific clubs, 
provided a splendid avenue to raise a revolutionary war 
chest.  The circulation was widespread and survived on 
donations and virtually without subscriptions.  Patria was 
widely read in households, churches, and, most importantly, 
aloud from the lectern during the workdays in the cigar 
factories--thus honoring a long standing Cuban tradition.41  
Patria galvanized revolutionary-minded Cubans around an 
organized structure.42  Martí succeeded where others had 
failed.  He unified a myriad of people and their distinct 
organizations under a single democratic banner known as the 
"Cuban Revolutionary Party."43  Patria was its voice.  And 
an independent Cuba was its causus belli. 
 Martí’s success, however, went beyond mass appeal.  He 
enlisted into the Cuban Revolutionary Party's structure the 
patriot-warriors of the Ten Years's War.  Men, who, on the 
one hand, might have had militaristic ambition for 
governing afterwards.  But, men, also, who had proven 
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themselves experienced leaders, knew how to fight, and who 
drew instant respect from those whom they commanded and 
those with whom they had to contend.  These men--spread 
around the Caribbean, some living quite comfortably, yet 
still desiring an independent Cuba--included personalities 
such as Antonio Maceo in Costa Rica and General Maximo 
Gomez in the Dominican Republic.44 
 Finally, for the stool to stand, it required three 
legs: Martí’s greatest triumph was organizing support and 
forming clubs on the island, itself.45  This was no small 
feat for a man who could not go to Cuba.  Therein shown one 
of Jose Martí’s noblest traits: remaining in contact, 
directly and, sometimes, indirectly, with people he met 
over the years.  An especially notable example was the 
mulatto Cuban Juan Gualberto Gomez.46  Martí, after the 
lifting of his exile in 1878, had practiced law with Gomez 
during his two years in Cuba.  Gomez was the kingpin for 
receiving and distributing Party information throughout 
Cuba.47 
 Martí’s unique historical distinction is summed within 
three categories.  First, his Cuban National Vision 
(written and adopted before the Revolution) specifically 
excluded a totalitarian-style of government and included a 
society of racial equality.  Second, his success to 
organize congressionally and financially Cuban patriots 
(again, before the Revolution) throughout the United States 
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and Latin America, which included like-thinkers who were 
still in Cuba.  And, third, his skill as a negotiator and 
leader (foremost, reflected in obtaining not just oral but 
written acceptance of the Cuban Revolutionary Party's 
vision and financial commitment from a diverse collection 
of civil and military Cuban patriots before the Revolution 
began). 
 That self-aggrandizement motivated Jose Martí seems 
explained away by the Latin American historian, Manuel 
Pedro Gonzalez: Martí’s life "was one of perpetual 
renunciation of worldly goods and material benefits."48  
Although Martí’s material impoverishment resulted from his 
own choices, Gonzalez poignantly expanded the analysis to 
include family estrangement as Martí’s greatest sacrifice:  
"He lost his beloved son and his wife, because the latter 
refused to share his idealism and spirit of sacrifice."49 
 In the same vein that United States' history credits 
and honors Thomas Jefferson for writing the Declaration of 
Independence and a newly-formed United States' Congress for 
the Bill of Rights, Cubans esteem Jose Martí for four 
similarly important contributions to Cuba's history.  Of 
important note, like Jefferson and Congress, Jose Martí 
acquired signed-on acceptance in democratic form by the 
individual chapters of the Cuban Revolutionary Party of his 
four documents prior to the revolution. 
 The heart and soul of the Cuban revolution depended on 
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a civilian government, of democratic origin, already in 
place prior to the revolution.  Martí’s first important 
document was "The Tampa Resolutions" adopted by the Tampa 
émigré colony on 28 November 1891.50  It was a preamble, 
much like a mission statement, which succinctly stated why 
a revolution in Cuba should occur. 
 The second document was the "Platform of the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party" adopted in January, 1892.51  It was a 
declaration of the revolution's intent.  Most importantly, 
however, it spelled out Cuba's role after the revolution, 
citing, in particular, equal human rights for the Spanish 
population who wished to remain in Cuba and for Cuba's 
black population. 
 The third document, entitled "Secret Statutes of the 
Party," also gained acceptance in January, 1892.52  It 
defined the structure of the revolutionary party.  Titled 
"Secret" because there was no intent for it to go beyond 
the party, itself.  It outlined the associations that 
comprised the revolutionary party, in and outside of Cuba, 
delineating the organization's associations in a way that 
if enemies detected any one of them, they had no effective 
way to trace the others beyond that single one. 
 And, the fourth document, adopted in April, 1892, was 
"The Invitation to Puerto Rico" to join Cuba in 
revolution.53  Included within each of the four documents 
was the urgency for moving forward with the revolution, not 
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just to remove Spanish rule, but to block the advance of 
the United States from absorbing Cuba, and thereby 
extending its influence deeper into the Caribbean.54  
American historical consensus is that Cuban Independence 
had little chance to occur at the time without Jose Martí, 
despite the United States' eventual intervention and the 
Spanish-American War.  Jose Martí brewed the Revolution to 
a boil during his fifteen years of exile. 
 As for Gomez and Martí, it comes as no surprise that 
Martí, who was so very, very far removed from his normal 
way of life upon his arrival in Cuba in 1895, fell in 
battle within a mere five weeks.  Nor is it a surprise that 
Gomez, a wily survivor, lived to nearly seventy-years old 
and died of natural causes in 1905. 
 To this day conflicting reviews surround Martí’s 
death, which occurred in his one and only encounter with 
Cuban Spanish forces.  From among the various accounts of 
his death, however, the most plausible exists in Charles 
Chapman's A History of the Cuban Republic, published in 
1927.55  Chapman recounted simply and logically why Martí 
joined--or, rather, got permission to join Gomez's 
invasion.  There was no better spice-of-speech than for the 
Revolution's main man abroad to season his already 
effective fund raising appeals with the acclaim, I have 
been to the scene of war and we are winning. 
 By Chapman's account, Martí’s fateful moment happened 
 30 
while in the protective escort of fifty men acting under 
Gomez's order to conduct Martí to a safe harbor on the 
southern shoreline of Cuba.  Martí, had he made it there, 
intended to travel to Jamaica and then back to the United 
States to resume the activities at which he was the most 
effective.  Chapman's account, however, raised undocumented 
speculation by referring to an unnamed guide's "betrayal of 
Martí’s excursion" and, consequently, the "Spanish ambush" 
which ultimately took his life and those of the entire 
escort party of fifty.56 
 31 
NOTES 
 
Chapter Two 
                                                        
1.  Chapman, Cuban Republic, 76. 
2.  Rafael Estenger, ed., Jose Martí, Obras Escogidas 
(Habana: Liberia Economica, 1953), 1213-14, (hereafter 
cited as Estenger, ed., Martí, Obras Escogidas). 
3.  Gomez, Diario, 285. 
4.  Ronning, Martí and the Emigre Colony, 10-15. 
5.  Ibid., 10-15. 
6.  Thomas, Cuba, 317. 
7.  Philip Foner, ed. and Elinor Randall, trans., Martí 
Major Poems, 1: Foner said Martí’s mother was "a girl from 
Spain."  Juan de Onis, ed. and trans., The America of Jose 
Martí, Selected Writings by Jose Martí, (NY: Noonday Press, 
1953), xi, (hereafter cited as Onis, The America of Jose 
Martí): "From 1871-1874 [Martí] wrote in Spain, the Spain 
of his parents";  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 8: 
Ronning said Martí’s father was from Valencia, Spain, and 
his mother was from the Spanish Canary Islands; Thomas, 
Cuba, 295: Thomas revealed Martí’s mother was also from the 
Canary Islands, but, "part of Martí’s childhood was passed 
in Spain. . . and besides Jose, [his parents had] six 
daughters." 
 
8.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 8; Thomas, Cuba, 
295. 
9.  Manuel Pedro Gonzalez, Jose Martí (Chapel Hill: Un. of 
N.C., 1953), 72, (hereafter cited as Gonzalez, Jose Martí). 
10.  Ibid. 
11.  Thomas, Cuba, 1589; Onis, The America of Jose Martí, 
xi: "All [Martí’s] literary out put, so varied, so 
haphazard, much of it unpublished or buried in publications 
of local circulation and in limited private editions 
printed in new York, was inaccessible to Hispanic readers 
until it was collected years after his death.  Acquaintance 
with the work of Martí has consequently been slow and 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                                  
difficult even in Spanish, and much more so in other 
languages." 
12.  Thomas, Cuba, 1588. 
13.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Major Poems, 1. 
14.  Ibid. 
15.  Foner, ed. and Elinor Randall trans., Martí, Our 
America, 10; Thomas, Cuba, 245. 
16.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 9. 
17.  Chapman, Cuban Republic, 42-3. 
18.  Ibid. 
19.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 10-11; Horatio S. 
Rubens, "The Insurgent Government in Cuba," The North 
American Review, Vol. CLXVL (1898): 560.  
20.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 8. 
21.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Major Poems, 1-
2; Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 8-9; Thomas, Cuba, 
295. 
22.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Major Poems, 2; 
Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 9; Thomas, Cuba, 295. 
23.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Major Poems, 2. 
24.  Foner, Cuba, v. II, 225-26. 
25.  Foner, Cuba, v. II, 225; Foner, ed. and Randall, 
trans., Martí, Our America,60, fn. 8. 
26.  Thomas, Cuba, 295. 
27.  Chapman, Cuban Republic, 42; Thomas, Cuba, 296. 
28.  Thomas, Cuba, 296: Martí married Carmen Zayas Bazan in 
Mexico. 
29.  Thomas, Cuba, 296. 
30.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Major Poems, 23.  
 33 
                                                                                                                                                                  
His son, Jose Martí Zayas Bazan, was born in Havana on 12 
November 1878. 
31.  Chapman, Cuban Republic, 75; Ronning, Martí and the 
Émigré Colony, 9. 
32.  Thomas, Cuba, 297, 300. 
33.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Our America, 11; 
Thomas, Cuba, chap XXV. 
34.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Our America, 26. 
35.  Thomas, Cuba, 87-8. 
36.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Our America, 19, 
25-6, 59. 
37.  Foner, ed. and Randall, Trans., Martí, Major Poems, 1-
17.  
38.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 20. 
39.  Ibid., 20. 
40.  Ibid., 4, 67.   
41.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 110, 132-33. 
42.  Ibid., 4, 80, 111, 132-33. 
43.  Ibid., 58-61. 
44.  Rubens, "The Insurgent Government In Cuba," The North 
American Review, v. CLXVI (1898): 560; Philip Foner, The 
Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American 
Imperialism 1895-1902 (NY: Monthly Review, 1972), v. I, 
xxii-iii, (hereafter cited as Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-
American War). 
45.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 88; Horatio S. 
Rubens, Liberty: The Story of Cuba (NY: Brewer, Warren and 
Putnam, 1932), 31 (hereafter cited as Rubens, Liberty). 
46.  Ronning, Martí and the Émigré Colony, 9. 
47.  Rubens, Liberty, 31; Rubens, an American, felt drawn to 
the task of service, without pay, served as the Cuban 
 34 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Revolutionary Party's Counsel throughout the entire 
revolution--see 25, 30-3 for appraisal of Martí’s 
magnetism.  
48.  Gonzalez, Jose Martí, 73. 
49.  Ibid. 
50.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Our America, 
263-64. 
51.  Ibid., 265-67. 
52.  Ibid., 268-70. 
53.  Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Our America, 
281-82. 
54.  This theme is prevalent in Martí’s writings.  Moreover, 
patriots compounded it during his lifetime.  Two 
significant documents are especially worth mentioning 1) 
”Cuba Must Be Free of the United States As Well As Spain: A 
Letter to Gonzalo Quesada (New York, October 29, 1889)"--a 
chapter in Foner, ed. and Randall, trans., Martí, Our 
America, 242-48.  And, 2), perhaps the most quoted (and 
endeared) of Martí’s anti-United States’ words rested in 
his unfinished letter, found on the breakfast table the day 
before he was killed: "It is my duty to prevent. . . by the 
independence of Cuba, the United States from spreading over 
the West Indies and falling. . . upon other lands of our 
America.  All I have done up to now, and shall do 
hereafter, is to that end."  Foner, ed. and Randall, 
trans., Martí, Our America, 59. 
 
55.  Chapman, Cuban Republic, 76.  
56.  Ibid. 
35 
CHAPTER 3 
 
DAY ONE, SIX MEN IN A YACHT 
 
 On 1 April 1895 Jose Martí and Maximo Gomez departed 
Montecristi and sailed to Cuba.  They intended to lead the 
revolution, officially underway since 24 February.  Four 
other insurgents accompanied them.  None of the six were 
sailors.  Martí and Gomez chartered a sailboat, the 
Brothers, outfitted with captain and crew, and planned to 
sail a roundabout course through the Bahamas. 
 The achievement of departure was neither facile nor 
free of fiasco.  Indeed, the situation scarcely improved in 
the next eleven days.  Despite obstacles, those past and 
those yet to come, the entire party reached Cuba on 11 
April 1895.  They did not arrive, however, on the wind or 
aboard the Brothers--but at the mercy of Providence in 
their own rowboat. 
 Scholarly accounts of Martí and Gomez's expedition 
have largely amounted to rewriting the same basic facts.1  
For the most part the facts are from Martí’s diary, and, to 
a lessor extent, Gomez's.  Historians have preferred 
quoting from Martí’s, which for flamboyancy, far outdoes 
Gomez's.2  Martí’s rendition, translated into English on at 
least three separate occasions, has proved the most readily 
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acceptable and colorfully quotable (in Spanish and 
English)--in particular, his entry describing the stormy 
night the intrepid party rowed to Cuba: 
 The [crew of the Nordstrand] lowered the boat.  
It was raining hard as we pushed off.  We set the 
wrong course. There were conflicting and confused 
opinions in boat.  There occurred another down 
pour.  The rudder lost.  But we got on course.  I 
took the forward oar.  Salas rowed steadily.  
Paquito Barrero and the General [Gomez] helped in 
the stern.  We strapped on our revolvers.  We 
steered toward a clearing.  The moon came up red 
behind a cloud. We landed on a rocky beach, La 
Playita.  I was the last to leave the boat, 
bailing out water.  I jumped ashore with great 
joy.3 
 Beyond Martí’s famous quotation, Hispanic and English 
historians have given only passing interest to the party's 
eleven-day voyage. Gomez's version has almost completely 
lacked examination.  He, incidentally, wrote a somewhat 
different story about the night they landed and implied 
that he, not Martí, was the captain of the rowboat: 
 Not a star shown in the sky.  The squall made 
fast.  The steamer [Nordstrand] stopped for a 
moment and quickly off-loaded our rowboat, arms, 
and equipment, and we six fell within; anyone 
would say that we were six crazy people. 
   The ship steamed off and we were abandoned, 
surrounded in enormous terror.  None of us were 
sailors, and yet, we made use of the oars. 
   Martí and Cesar were at the bow and rowed very 
badly, yet furiously; the others were in the 
center, I held the rudder, which, no sooner than 
I understood it and aimed us on course, it broke-
away and was lost. 
   The darkness was deep, and the showers got 
worse.  We lost our course and could not see the 
shore well.  We saw two men on shore and imagined 
they were Spanish guards; I reset our course, and 
despite all our misery and extraordinary fatigue, 
we managed to make way. 
   Providence did not desert us; the showers 
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calmed, the night cleared and the moon began to 
rise in the east. 
   We began to row with more mastery.  Borrero and 
I used an oar for a rudder, and by pushing, we 
directed the boat with very good results. 
   [Our first choice] for disembarkation was not 
possible, there were jagged rocks that rose 
abruptly and the sea banged them with fury--we 
continued to row a little further.  By good 
fortune we rounded a bend and found a cove, "The 
Playita."  There we directed our boat, and 
luckily, to its beach.4 
 Historians have neglected some details.  Their choices 
suggest they were simply in a hurry to get Martí (and 
Gomez) to Cuba--where, of course, the action was. 
 An historical narrative of Martí and Gomez’s entire 
eleven-day journey typically reads along the following 
lines.  Their invasion was, of course, intended to be 
stealthy.  (Both, in fact, implied in their diaries that 
the Captain of the Brothers was privy to the plan.)  The 
crew, however, changed their minds and bolted at the first 
opportunity, Inagua, British Bahamas.  (There is an 
historical assumption that the crew knew the plan.)  The 
captain (who did not emerge as a good man in either diary) 
used the excuse of short-handedness to nix the deal.  He 
stranded the party in Inagua.  A German fruit ship, the 
Nordstrand, saved the day.  Now, in a truly summarized 
history, the Nordstrand’s Captain attended directly to 
business and dropped the insurgents off in a rowboat three 
miles from the Cuban shoreline.  Historians, in somewhat 
more thorough accounts, have noted that the Nordstrand 
zigzagged back and forth between Inagua, Hispaniola, and 
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Inagua (which is true) before Captain Loewe dropped his 
passengers. 
 A fresh examination of the original Spanish versions 
of both diaries for the answer to the question of why a 
minor distance between two points required eleven days 
reveals a story of conflict, courage, perseverance, and 
comedy. 
 Importantly, Martí and Gomez were not always on 
friendly terms.  The day they met in New York, 18 October 
1885, respect for one another dissolved rapidly and neither 
spoke to the other for nearly seven years. Their rift 
occurred over leadership.  The substance of their meeting 
concerned the recent 1878 revolution in Cuba, known as the 
"Ten Years' War," a war in which Gomez had fought but not 
Martí.5 
 Martí intended for civilian leadership to direct the 
upcoming war they were planning: Gomez held out for 
military control.  Exactly two days after they met, Martí 
withdrew his support with a lengthy, eloquent letter to 
Gomez--overflowing with symbolism and metaphor.  "What are 
we, General," he asked rhetorically, "the brave and 
fortunate military leaders who, with whip in hand and spurs 
on the heels of their boots, are preparing to lead a people 
into war, only to lord it over them in the aftermath?"6 
 Insulted, but not outdone, Gomez ignored Martí’s 
letter and instead dipped his pen in vitriol.  "Martí," he 
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said, "cannot operate in any sphere without claims to 
dominate."  Gomez also posed realistic comparisons between 
himself, "this old soldier," and the likes of Martí, 
"orators and poets."7 
 Martí had included a rebuttal conveniently in the 
resignation letter he had previously sent.  But, Gomez, in 
the heat of the moment, probably tossed it away and missed 
the chance to read, "do you set out to suffocate thought 
even before finding yourself leading an enthusiastic and 
grateful people?" 
 Gomez, in fact, knew all too painfully that there was 
little room (if any) in war for philosophers and romantics. 
He wrote simply and clearly what he sought, "powder and 
bullets and men to go with me to the battlefields of my 
country to kill its tyrants."8 
 In reality, Martí and Gomez were as similar as they 
were different.  Eventually, they came to terms over the 
notion that they needed each other.  Beginning in 1892, 
Martí began to consolidate Cuban sentiment and fund a war 
chest the size of which amazed Gomez.  Shrewdly enough, 
Martí’s success and growing popularity did not come at 
Gomez's expense. 
 Martí knew Gomez was a popular warrior--in fact, Gomez 
was the very epitome of hardiness and honesty--and upon 
that perception Martí capitalized.  Also, among potential 
Cuban revolutionaries of the time, there was little doubt 
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of Gomez accepting, if offered, command of the 
Revolutionary Army.  However, Martí’s constituency 
pondered, how deeply did the feud between Martí and Gomez 
run?  Martí knew popular sentiment for the Party's Chief 
rested with Gomez.  And the historian, Neal Ronning, 
implies the conclusion that throughout the growth period of 
the Cuban Revolutionary Party Martí tempered his 
philosophical lingo toward (1) mending fences and (2) 
putting words and thoughts into Gomez's brain and mouth.  
Safe and comfortable at his hacienda in Montecristi, Gomez 
remained mute on the subject of Martí.9 
 Finally, came their reunion.  Martí traveled alone on 
11 September 1892 to Montecristi to ask Gomez to assume 
Command of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, a position Gomez 
accepted.  Indeed, Gomez went so far as to accept the role 
of Chief under civilian direction; but only until the war 
began, then he intended for the leadership and command to 
shift to him.  Martí knew better than to try for too much 
too early.  Below the surface there lingered past feelings. 
Gomez wrote of the occasion that he accepted Martí’s 
proposal, "because he came in the name of Cuba."10 
 But Martí still had another shoe to drop, one of which 
Gomez was unaware.  On 25 March 1895--exactly six days 
before they sailed on the Brothers for Cuba from Gomez’s 
hacienda in Montecristi--Martí, purportedly, with Gomez's 
input, drafted the benchmark document, "Manifesto of 
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Montecristi."  Gomez and Martí both signed it.  The minute 
proportion to which Gomez contributed toward the draft is 
revealed in its first sentence, which was more than one 
hundred and fifty words.11  In contrast, Gomez's pithy 
writing style bears a man who intended to have his position 
easily understood by anybody on the first reading. 
 Also, the Manifesto proposed a significantly different 
kind of war than the one just ended in 1878.  The document 
philosophically outlined the war policy: 
 (1) The war would be civilized; (2) enlistment of 
the Negro population was necessary for victory, 
and the charge that the Negro race was a threat 
was perpetrated by the Spanish for the purpose of 
spreading fear of the revolution; (3) non-
combatant Spaniards would never be the object of 
revenge, persecution, or extortion; (4) private 
rural wealth which did not intentionally hamper 
the revolution would be respected; and, (5) the 
revolution would introduce a new economic life in 
Cuba.12 
 The Manifesto also projected Cuban political and 
social life after the war but neglected to say precisely 
how to achieve this.  Gomez revealed his true sentiments, 
ones at variance with the Manifesto, in orders he issued on 
6 November 1895 (barely five months after Martí’s demise): 
   Article 1.  All plantations shall be totally 
destroyed, their cane and outbuildings burned and 
railroad connections destroyed. 
   Article 2.  All laborers who shall aid the 
sugar factories. . . shall be considered traitors 
to their country. 
   Article 3.  All who are caught in the act, or 
whose violation of Article 2 shall be proven, 
shall be shot.13 
 Ironically, neither Gomez nor Martí, technically 
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speaking, were Cuban.  Gomez was a Dominican.  Martí, 
although born in Havana, was of immediate Spanish heritage 
and spent part of his childhood in Spain when his parents 
returned. Eventually, however, his parents returned to 
Cuba.  Also, Martí enjoyed exile in Spain as a Spaniard, at 
the behest of Spanish rule and in lieu of prison, for four 
years where he obtained college degrees. 14 
 After leaving Spain in late 1874, Martí made his home 
in a host of countries (i.e., Guatemala for a year, Mexico 
for four years and the United States for fifteen years).  
Except for two years, directly after the end of his exile 
at the conclusion of the Ten Years' War in 1878, Martí 
never set foot on Cuban soil until he, Gomez, and the four 
insurgents rowed to the Cuban shoreline on 11 April 1895. 
Martí, himself, wrote to a friend in 1879, "If Cuba were 
not so unfortunate, I would love Mexico more than Cuba." 15 
 Among Cuban patriots Jose Martí was not without 
critics.  Yet, even they agreed he was indispensable.  His 
preeminent leadership grew from organizing a myriad of 
Cuban émigré communities under one umbrella.  Martí became 
the quasi-democratically elected "Civilian Delegate" (as he 
called himself) for the Cuban Revolutionary Party, the 
party he created.16  Through his leadership, punctuated by 
his awe-inspiring oratory and gifted pen, the Party emerged 
as the financial backbone for Cuba's decisive war for 
independence.  Biblical prose described well what Martí 
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meant to the zealous followers.  Neal Ronning admirably 
compiled an array in his historical work, Jose Martí and 
the Emigre Colony in Key West: 
 Esteban Borrero referred to him as "the Prophet, the 
Apostle, the Christ of the present revolution."  And 
in 1895, the year of his death, another follower 
wrote that "when he made his pilgrimages. . .he went 
from triumph to triumph, acclaimed as a messiah, 
listened to as a prophet (Cruz 1895)." That year, of 
course, saw a great outpouring of anguish: Martí 
"was like Moses of antiquity, appointed to carry out 
the divine work of redemption of his people. . . 
[His death] has converted Boca de Dos Rios [the 
place of his death] into the Mount Golgotha of Cuban 
redemption" (Zayas 1895).17 
 Martí was no small man when it came to turning the 
playing tables a certain way.  On 29 January 1895, two days 
before he left New York to rendezvous with Gomez, Martí had 
already issued (and signed for Gomez) the order which would 
officially launch the revolution in Cuba on 24 February.  
Horatio Rubens, legal counsel for the Cuban Revolutionary 
Party and friend and admirer of Martí, recorded in his 
memoirs a conversation just as Martí issued Gomez's order. 
The Rubens' narrative has helped significantly to 
understand Martí’s mindset: 
 Martí [after initiating the order] would embark 
for [Montecristi], where he would meet General 
Gomez, and proceed to Cuba.  I thought General 
Gomez might hesitate to go under certain 
transport conditions I foresaw might easily 
arise.  Martí brushed that aside.  "He will go; 
at any rate, I shall tell him, ‘I am going, and I 
know you will go with me'."18 
 The transport issue aside, Rubens' recollection also 
contained the important fact that from the outset Gomez 
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strongly objected to including Martí in the invasion party. 
Martí, however, changed Gomez's mind.  Rubens related that 
the untimely arrival of a newspaper during Martí’s stay 
with Gomez provided a story which spoke too directly on the 
sensitive subject that Martí might send others where he did 
not have the courage to go.  According to Rubens, this 
cinched the idea for Martí to sail with Gomez--come hell or 
high water.  In the face of overwhelming determination 
Gomez relented.19 
 The same day they signed the Manifesto Martí fired-off 
a letter to Federico Henriquez (who was described by Philip 
Foner only as a prominent benefactor).  Martí wrote: 
 I am writing to you with deep emotion in the 
silence of a home [Gomez's] about to be abandoned 
this very day for the good of my country.  The 
least I can do in gratitude for this virtue--
since I am thus accepting my duty instead of 
shirking it--is to face death, whether it awaits 
us on land or sea, in the company of one [Gomez] 
who, as a result of my efforts and out of respect 
for his own, as well as for the passionate spirit 
common to our lands, is leaving his loving and 
happy home to set foot in our enemy-ridden 
country with a handful of brave men. . . .  
Wherever my first duty may lie, in Cuba or 
abroad, there I will be.  It may even be possible 
or necessary, as up to now it would appear, for 
me to do both. . . .  I promoted the war; with it 
my responsibility begins, not ends."20 
 Martí was a man possessed.  Early on he determined for 
the revolution to succeed.  With super-human energy he 
pushed forward to achieve the dream of a free and 
independent Cuba--and he did not care on whose toes he 
stepped.  Yet, there was hardly a letter written which did 
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not include an interesting mixture of humility and 
subservience, bordering on obsequiousness.21  A significant 
failing in Jose Martí was his inability to understand that 
as a politician he would not be liked by everybody.22 
 Albeit, he re-inspired contemporary Cuban heroes.  For 
example, Antonio Maceo, like Gomez, was another no-nonsense 
kind of man with unfinished business from the Ten Years' 
War.  Maceo had stubbornly refused to sign the peace pact 
in 1878.  Instead, he went into exile in Costa Rica.  Maceo 
was pure Cuban, a mulatto in whose veins flowed the blood 
of slaves and Spaniards.  It took little persuasion for 
Maceo to return to Cuba.23 
 But Maceo intended to return to the island in style, 
on a transport that reflected first rate appointment.  
Martí had only $2,000 available to afford a venture while 
Maceo believed he required $5,000.  A rift occurred when 
Martí selected one of Maceo's men, Flor Crombet, to 
organize the invasion with the limited funds.24 
 Martí shamed Maceo in a letter into setting aside his 
pride and style and invade Cuba in the name of patriotism, 
regardless of transport.  At this juncture, and more 
notable in the letter than Maceo's pride and patriotism 
was, of all things, Martí foreshadowing the style in which 
he and Gomez would undertake: 
 Should you, in the height of your prestige, go 
with the brave men who are with you?  But you 
tell me again that you require a sum which we 
have not; and as the sailing of you and your 
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comrades is indispensable, be it in a cockle-
shell or in a leviathan, you will be on board 
when they give you the cockle-shell [italics 
added].25 
 Coincidentally, on 25 March--perhaps around the same 
time Martí was twisting Gomez’s arm into signing the 
Manifesto of Montecristi--Antonio Maceo and twenty-two 
others, disguised as field hands and fooling no one, 
departed Costa Rica for Cuba on board an American steam 
ship, the Adirondack.26  He and his band arrived in Cuba on 
31 March--one day before Martí and Gomez's departure.  But 
as propitious as Maceo's arrival was for Cuban 
independence, his final transportation choice may well have 
proved decisively negative for Martí and Gomez when they 
arrived in Inagua. 
 Until recently, the premise held that around midnight 
on 1 April 1895, Jose Martí, Maximo Gomez, Francisco 
Borrero, Angel Guerra, Cesar Salas and Marcos del Rosario 
pushed off from the shore of Montecristi on the sailing 
ship Brothers. 27  But in Horatio Rubens' 1932 account the 
exact hour and precise means were not accurate.  Yet these 
facts trickled into print, and thus shaped Martí and 
Gomez’s journey.  Rubens derived his facts from a story 
within a story involving the death of, all people, Antonio 
Maceo.  On 7 December 1896 Maceo fell at El Cacahual.   In 
the battle that took him also perished Maximo Gomez's son, 
Francisco.  In a heroic struggle Francisco shielded Maceo 
with his body.  He was nineteen.  Upon Gomez fell the sad 
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task to write his wife, Bernada, the boy’s mother.  He 
alluded to the night he left Montecristi: 
 Before I left for Cuba in 1895, the boy said, "I 
know that you are soon going to Cuba; what are 
you going to do with me?  [He was only 17.]  I 
replied, "you stay here."  The boy said, "duty 
compels me to go by your side.  It is impossible 
that I do nothing but push off the vessel that is 
to carry you to sacrifice for the liberty of the 
country of my birth. . .  [He was born in Cuba 
during the Ten Years' War.] 
   It was necessary for Martí to interfere and 
convince the boy.  [Martí himself was killed on 
19 May 1895.] 
   On that dark night, at midnight April 1, '95, 
none other than my five expeditionary companions 
could hear the kisses that I gave my sons 
Francisco and Maximito [who was 15], on the 
shores of Dominican waters; but the words that my 
son Francisco murmured in my ear, only God and I 
heard them.  He said, "I shall die or be at your 
side."28 
 Now, thanks to (a distant relative of Gomez’s) Olga 
Lobetty Gomez de Morel's recent publication, Jose Martí en 
Montecristi (1999), there exists new information.  
Francisco indeed pushed off the boat that carried the six 
insurgents for Cuba.  It was a tender.  He pushed it away 
from a deserted and craggy Dominican beach located a few 
miles south of Montecristi around 3 a.m., 2 April 1895, 
toward the anchored and waiting Brothers.29  Also, that the 
insurgents' preoccupation was indeed for their loved ones 
that night, there is no doubt.  On 1 April Martí wrote to 
his sixteen-year-old son, who still lived in Cuba with his 
mother, Martí’s estranged wife of over fifteen years, 
Carmen Zayas Bazan: 
 Tonight I leave for Cuba: I leave without you, 
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when you should be by my side.  As I leave, I 
think of you.  If I disappear on the way, you 
will receive with this letter the watch chain 
that your father used in life.  Good bye. Be 
fair.  Jose Martí.30 
 
 Martí died and never reunited with his son.  But his 
son, Jose Martí, Jr., took up his father's cause.31  He 
left his mother in New York in 1896 where she was 
presumably in hot-pursuit of the proceeds of a $50,000 life 
insurance policy on her deceased husband.32 
 Martí left behind at least one impassioned devotee, 
however, when he departed Gomez's house--Gomez's daughter, 
Clemency, with whom he had taken sundry strolls during his 
six weeks in Montecristi.  On the day he left, she drew 
from her long dark hair a blue ribbon.  She told him to 
take it as a remembrance for "all the fire of so many 
thoughts, and one of the colors of our flag"; he "smiled 
deeply and handled it like something sacred" and said he 
would keep the token "next to the weakest part in his 
chest."33 
 Before they left Gomez's house that night, Gomez’s 
wife, two sisters (Regina and Maria de Jesus), and 
Clemency, packed for the group two days worth of 
provisions--dried meat, fruit, and coffee.34  Their 
assumption for the voyage's duration was ample because 
sailing from anywhere along the shoreline of Montecristi 
for Cuba or Inagua required less than a day and one-half.35 
 Their plan relied on precise timing.  Until about 
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midnight on 1 April the tide flowed at Montecristi.  On 
that tide, and under the cover of darkness, Captain Bastian 
slipped in unobserved.  Once among the barrier islands--yet 
beyond the range of anyone's sight and, more crucially, 
where there was no threat of grounding on the receding 
tide--he anchored.  Then, according to known facts, he sent 
a rowboat to fetch the insurgents at a prearranged 
location.36 
 Once safely on board, the Brothers sailed on the ebb 
tide.  The moment of relief--for captain, crew and 
insurgents--came after they cleared the shoals around the 
barrier islands of Montecristi.  From there they entered 
the prevailing current and blessed trade wind which flows 
and blows along the northern coastline of Hispaniola--
pushing boats, ships, and flotsam between the narrows of 
Cuba and the Bahamas. 
 Earlier that night, however, Martí and Gomez's plan 
began to unravel.  Only five of the six insurgents left 
Gomez's house at midnight.  They waited for Cesar Salas, 
the party's treasurer, for as long as possible.37  Their 
decision to leave without him illustrates dramatically the 
truism that time and tide wait for no man. 
 Morel related that the group took a southwesterly 
route from Gomez's house--thus heading toward the direction 
of the nearby Haitian border.  They turned down a road just 
beyond the railroad tracks that ran straight to the 
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Montecristi harbor.  Commercial enterprises, customs' 
officials, and Spanish spies dotted the harbor. 
 These spies had specifically kept an eye on Martí and 
Gomez's whereabouts for sometime.  There was nothing 
special about these men; such is the kind who commonly 
poked around docks to make a quick buck.  Gomez, himself, 
credited them with higher status than they deserved when he 
used the word "spies."  In reality they were just paid 
informants, if they were lucky enough to have anything to 
report to the Spanish Vice-consular official stationed in 
Montecristi.  Certainly, had the insurgents attempted their 
departure at the docks, even (or especially) during the 
night, an eager swarm of thirsty informants existed to 
report the activities. 
 The party was detected despite their precaution.  Just 
off of the road on the way to their rendezvous they 
overtook a "Haitian and disarmed him and bound him."  Gomez 
was impatient to get to the waiting tender, which would 
have had no choice but to leave without them.  Further he 
reflected "an evil humor."  Gomez's bad mood resulted not 
only because one of his party was absent, but also because 
the missing one had all of the "disposable cash."38 
 Through the process of elimination Morel deduced from 
the description in Martí’s diary that the embarkation point 
was "The Beach of the Farm."  It was the only coastline 
point flat enough for a tender to rendezvous with someone 
51 
and matched the time allotted for the party's horse and 
foot journey.39  It was, also, as Martí related, a stretch 
brimming at high tide with eery green florescence, the 
pungent aroma of aquatic salt marsh, and knee and chest-
high verdure with thistles and thorns.40 
 Finally, by the light of a meager moon, they saw that 
the tender still waited.  Not far away they heard a dog 
bark.  Then, suspending even more the silence of the night, 
they heard coming toward them sounds of desperate rustling 
in the thick vegetation.  In the nick of time, Cesar Salas 
emerged from the thickets, to everybody’s relief.41  Gomez 
(a man of few words) cogently tallied in his diary: 
 After enormous expenses, defeats and obstacles--
two months of suffering and torture--we six in 
the early morning have embarked.  The place of 
our embarkation and my companions I will say 
later.  We have thrown ourselves into the arms of 
an uncertain future and destiny.  But we do so in 
compliance with our word.  We are responding to 
Cubans who are already in arms, and I trust in 
Providence to reward us with success.42 
 Alternatively, in his diary on 1 April, Martí perused 
a smorgasbord of sensory perceptions.  Indeed, as a stand-
alone piece of history, Martí’s version of their 
embarkation has perplexing spots.  He neglected to include 
topics like sailboats, rowboats, insurgent members, where 
and why they were there, and where and why they intended to 
go; although, his divulgence did remarkable fairness to the 
surf and flora.  Another odd fact Martí included--and which 
seemed disturbingly out of place--was a peculiar and quaint 
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reference to the Haitian they caught: 
 Among the sea and plants and from under the depth 
of heaven emerged a black Haitian.  The man 
ascended to his full beauty in the silence of 
nature.43 
About the Haitian captive, little else was said, except 
that Maximito ("with revolver in hand") took him to a port 
near an inlet in a skiff (no other specifics were given).44 
 They sailed away in the early morning hours, a soldier 
and a poet.  One of them with a score to settle and the 
other with a vision: Cuba Libre!, a common cause linking 
unlikely allies.  Aptly, they sailed from near Montecristi, 
where, on Columbus' first voyage, January of 1493, the 
natives unwittingly presented him with the first nugget of 
gold from the New World.45  Thus began throughout the 
Americas a train of economic and cultural exploitation. 
 In the ensuing five hundred years Cuba materialized as 
Europe's most important waypoint.  On Cuba's back, Spain 
rode.  Gomez's enemy was Spain--simple to understand, like 
the man.  Martí’s enemy was far more complex. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
"PEARL OF THE ANTILLES" 
Part I 
 On 1 April 1895 when Jose Martí sailed from the 
Dominican Republic to join the Cuban Revolution for 
Independence, the United States and Spain had already 
engaged in several attempts to transfer Cuba to the United 
States.1  Jose Martí, the "Apostle" of Cuban Independence, 
dedicated the majority of his life to preventing that 
transfer.  Martí did as much to prevent the United States 
from acquiring Cuba as he did to liberate the island from 
Spanish rule.2  The United States and Spain were, for the 
most part, on friendly footing during this century of 
occasional negotiation over the island, particularly during 
the years of 1868 and 1895--the two incipient years of 
Cuban revolutions for independence. 
When Martí departed Montecristi on 1 April he expected 
the schooner, Brothers, to carry him, Maximo Gomez, and 
four insurgents to Cuba.  According to Lloyd's Register of 
Sailing Vessels, 1895-96, the Brothers, a wooden vessel, 
had at least two masts (as a schooner, and her rig ran fore 
and aft); but, she had no auxiliary power and only a single 
deck.3  According to Olga Lebetty Gomez de Morel, Captain 
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Bastian skippered the crew of three men.  All told, there 
were ten men on board.4   
 Under "limp winds," Gomez recorded in his diary on 2 
April, the Brothers sailed slowly for "33 hours to arrive 
at Inagua at 10 o'clock in the night on day three,"5 (a 
small Bahamian island forty-six miles north of Cuba).  As 
the crow-flies, the vessel had sailed only 137 miles.6  
Indeed, that was a slow voyage--an average of only four 
miles per hour.7 
 Martí was on the trip of a lifetime and had idle 
moments on his hands.  Consumed by his mission and a 
consummate lecturer, he had a captive audience.  So 
fervently did he hold forth that of the five who were not 
insurgents, only one, the black cook, David Caley, from the 
Turks and Caicos Islands (British, Caribbean), committed to 
continue the voyage beyond Inagua.8 
  Martí had a backlog of historical knowledge and 
personal experiences to share.  He believed the United 
States intended to possess Cuba unless the Cubans obtained 
independence.  He had lived in the United States, 1880-
1895, and had a unique vantage to observe the United 
States' calloused opinion concerning Cuba and Latin 
American countries:9 "I have lived inside the monster and 
know its insides--and my weapon is only the slingshot of 
David."10  Further, Martí had traveled extensively, serving 
as consul for Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay in the 
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United States. 
 Jose Martí, a genius and literary geyser, worked as a 
teacher in Harlem--teaching English to black Americans as 
well as Latinos.  He served as a journalist for the New 
York Sun to supplement his income.  Overshadowing 
everything else, however, he warned fellow Latin Americans 
about their likely fate if the United States' imperialistic 
expansion ultimately included Cuba.11  He zealously believed 
a domino effect would bring human subjugation and cultural 
meltdown throughout Latin America if the United States 
absorbed Cuba, the "Pearl of the Antilles."12 
 Jose Martí’s concerted efforts evolved in his works, 
notably: Our America (about Latin America), Inside the 
Monster (about the United States), and Ismaelillo (an 
acclaimed book of poetry, renowned in Martí’s own time).13  
He did not abhor Spain; rather he took pride that Latin 
American culture had such deep roots.  He did, however, 
deplore Spain's historical exploitation of Cuba, Cubans, 
and slaves.  On board the Brothers, Martí surely explained 
why they were there. 
 Early opponents to Cuban independence were the white 
population.14  These folk feared a civil war of the type 
which had occurred in French Haiti in 1791.15  That 
successful revolt stemmed from unmercifully aggressive 
sugar production and racial imbalance--a balance vastly in 
favor of free Negroes and Negro slave labor. 
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 At no time in Cuba's history had any accurate census 
occurred.  Compounding this, a tax on slaves caused rampant 
under-reporting.16  The life expectancy of a Cuban slave was 
only ten years,17 yet, sugar production doubled 
approximately every ten years during the early nineteenth 
century.18  It increased to the extent that by 1850 Cuba had 
become the world's largest single sugar supplier.19  This 
increase resulted from slave labor rather than 
technological improvements.20  Therefore, it logically 
followed, there was a steady and progressive, if unrecorded 
real growth in the ratio of free Negroes and Negro slaves 
to white Cubans.  The memory of Haiti's bloody slave 
revolution haunted the days and nights of the sugar-growers 
and Spanish administrators.21 
 Among white Cubans the imbalance bred a strong 
reliance upon Spain.  This relationship, however, had two 
streets.  Spain depended on Cuba to replenish her always-
depleted treasury, which resulted from Byzantine economic 
policies and Royal mismanagement.22  Thereupon, Spain 
pressured Cuba for increased sugar production.  
Consequently, the island acquired more slaves, becoming in 
essence a sugar and slave factory.23 
 A governor-general had served as the chief executive 
of Cuba since the 1500s.  This position, awarded by the 
crown to a Spanish noble, was an opportunity to acquire 
incredible wealth.  Spain's policy, however, was to hold 
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colonial administrators on a short leash, and Spanish 
authorities often scrutinized and, even, criticized their 
Cuban governors.24 
 
 But Spain had lost most of her New World Empire by 
1825.  Accordingly, scrutiny and criticism of hard-nosed 
tactics in Cuba mostly disappeared by 1830.  Bribery to 
permit an illicit slave trade and the under counting of 
slaves to evade taxes became the modus operandi.25  Thus, to 
augment the cash flow to Spain from tariffs and taxes, the 
position of governor-general generally went to that person 
who best governed unregulated.26  Hand-in-glove, Spain 
capitalized on Cuba's fear of racial revolt and cemented 
both Cuban loyalty and lucre.27 
 The United States, since Thomas Jefferson’s 
administration, had wished to annex Cuba.28  John Quincy 
Adams, Secretary of State during the Monroe administration 
(1817-1825), reflected best the position when he instructed 
Hugh Nelson, the United States' Minister to Spain, not to 
evacuate, but stay put when the European powers invaded 
Spain in 1823 to restore Spain's monarchy.  Adams saw Cuba: 
 . . . as an apple, severed by the tempest from 
its native tree, cannot choose but to fall to the 
ground. . . incapable of self support, and can 
only gravitate toward the North American Union."29 
Adam's vision--referred to by Cubans ever since as the "la 
fruta madura" (the ripe fruit)--began to mature when the 
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United States government announced the landmark "Monroe 
Doctrine" on 2 December 1823.30 
 The doctrine, never a law, just a presidential message 
to Congress, asserted the United States' adamant position 
against European expansion in the Western Hemisphere.31  
This unilateral approach for the United States rebuffed a 
bilateral proposal from England and intended to prevent any 
European power from absorbing Cuba and save it for 
herself.32 
 The United States had no intention for a European 
super-power, like Great Britain or France, to gain a 
strategic and potentially rich location so close to the 
United States' shores--especially a power intent on 
abolishing slavery.33  If Cuba did not remain a Spanish 
colony but fell--by design or otherwise--then by virtue of 
the Monroe Doctrine, she came under the protective custody 
of the United States.34 
 Spain perceived in 1830 Cuba not only as a cash cow 
but also as a launch site to reclaim her lost colonies 
throughout Latin America.35  Spain's colonies, except for 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, had gained their independence in a 
reaction to the Napoleonic Wars when they installed 
military juntas during the first decade of the nineteenth 
century.36  The juntas developed into self-governing bodies.  
Achieving independence, the new states abolished slavery to 
aid them in (1) their legitimate acceptance among European 
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powers; primarily because, (2) they had passed the need for 
slaves to mine depleted silver and gold mines.  And, (3) 
their potential for sugar cane production was miniscule 
compared to Cuba's.37  In general, the new nations also had 
a much smaller Negro population (due to attrition) which 
counteracted the kind of reliance Cuban Spaniards felt 
toward Spain. 
 Spain, however, was under enormous continental 
pressure because of her liberal policy toward slavery.38  
She also vacillated between a monarchy and a constitutional 
government, based expediently on those from whom she 
attempted to bargain assistance.  The Spaniards gave, and 
then took away, hope from a divided yet growing faction of 
stalwart Cubans who anticipated free trade.  These Cubans 
also hoped one day for Cuba to become a state of Spain and 
have seats in the Spanish Cortes.39  But, there, too, 
slavery posed a paradox.  Seats in the Spanish Congress 
reflected a head-count of sorts.  Also, Spain depended too 
heavily on Cuban funds.  Crooked Spanish officials, both in 
Cuba and in Spain, raked in untold sums of wealth from 
which they (like the mother country) had grown all too 
accustomed.40  The status quo in Cuba prevailed. 
 Nevertheless, Spain was in a bind over slavery.  
Cuba's aristocracy insisted that she defend slavery.  At 
the same time, Spain's European neighbors, upon whom her 
very government's existence depended and with whom she had 
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signed treaties to cease slave trading, insisted that she 
end slavery in Cuba.41 
 At this juncture Spain needed a friend.  Accordingly, 
she sought to ally herself with the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere.  The marriage between white Cubans, 
Spain, and the white southern population of the United 
States was a relationship based on slavery.  By the end of 
the 1830s, slavery existed in the western world in only 
four locations: Brazil, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the United 
States.  This starkly contrasted with the reality that by 
the early 1800s the European powers, including Spain, had 
signed a treaty with the intent to abolish the slave 
trade.42  The United States did not sign on because her 
economy, like Cuba's, relied heavily on slave labor. 
 The fact was, however, the United States Constitution 
had abolished importation of slaves after 1808--yet, 
enforcement was impossible.  Because the United States, for 
her own self-serving reasons, had not signed the treaty 
agreement with the European powers, her merchant ships 
possessed the legal right to evade treaty enforced measures 
on the high seas and to engage in illicit trading.43  
Consequently, a mutually beneficial arrangement developed 
between those with Spanish slave interests and United 
States' merchant flagships.44 
 The United States, of course, had a mixed bag of 
prosperity based on human bondage.  Southern slave states 
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feared that if abolition occurred in Cuba, the next likely, 
and unsettling, domino to fall was the United States.45  
Therefore, led by notable statesmen like the South 
Carolinian, John C. Calhoun--who viewed with interest 
preventing slave revolts in the United States and 
maintaining business as usual among the cotton producers 
and slave traders--United States' thinkers joined with 
Spain's.46  Ironically, with such a teammate in the Western 
Hemisphere, Spain needed no enemies.  
 For example, in October of 1854 three European 
Ministers from the United States--Pierre Soule to Spain, 
John Mason to France, and James Buchanan (the next 
President of the United States, 1857-1861) to England--
collaborated in Ostend, Belgium, to explain the failure of 
Soule to purchase Cuba from Spain.47  Soule had acted under 
direction from the Pierce Administration (1853-1857).48  The 
trio’s written opinion, entitled the "Ostend Manifesto," 
became dubbed the "Manifesto of the Brigands."49  The 
diplomats rationalized that the United States--for its 
economic well being and safety--ought immediately to invade 
Cuba and consolidate it before Spain's newly established, 
republican, revolutionary government abolished slavery. 
 The manifesto emphasized dramatically that a 
propitious moment for a Cuban invasion existed--Great 
Britain and France were, at the time, preoccupied with 
fighting the Crimean War.  The New York Herald shared with 
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its readers the threesome's twisted justification and 
bizarre analogy: The diplomats argued, with straight faces, 
the inevitable filtering of ideological, political, and 
economic ill effects into the United States if abolition 
occurred in Cuba.50  The solution was obvious: If your 
neighbor's house was on fire, and threatened yours, this 
was enough to "justify any individual in tearing down the 
burning house of his neighbor."51  Their appeal, but not 
their logic, failed. 
 The American slave states and Cuba's white planter 
class shortly embarked on a plan of their own.52  In 1856, 
only two years after the Ostend debacle, they set in motion 
a scheme to link a confederation of states throughout 
Central America.  The Pierce Administration did not object, 
so the mercenaries began with an unsanctioned United 
States' invasion of Nicaragua by William Walker.53  Walker 
received financial support from Cornelius Vanderbilt who 
stood to profit from his shipping lines throughout Central 
America.54  The United States government rapidly recognized 
the sovereignty of Walker's puppet government in Nicaragua 
on 15 May 1856.55 
 Walker intended to duplicate the method employed for 
acquiring Texas in 1845: (1) declare independence; and, (2) 
petition for statehood.56  Nicaragua's newly recognized 
government, within four month's from its inception, 
"revoked the decree abolishing slavery set by the Federal 
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Constituent Assembly of all the Central American States,"57 
a decree in existence since 1824.  Next, Nicaragua intended 
to serve as a staging site to annex Cuba.58  Dissension, 
however, within Nicaragua's new regime, a worldwide 
abolitionist focus, and a disarming assault from Costa 
Rica, squashed the regime and its manifold plans.59 
Part II 
Into that world of duplicity, tension, and intrigue, 
Jose Martí was born on 28 January 1853 in Havana.  So, too, 
around that time, one chapter in American and Cuban history 
ended and another began. 
 A series of events rapidly challenged the status quo 
in Cuba and the United States.  Abraham Lincoln won the 
Presidency.  The South seceded before his inauguration in 
March 1861.  Within a month civil war engulfed the United 
States.  In 1863 news of President Lincoln's "Emancipation 
Proclamation" resounded throughout Cuba like an earthquake. 
 When the southern states lost their bid for 
independence, Cuban slaveholders’ eyes turned to Spain.  
Spain, deeply in debt and divided by a host of growing 
internal failures, desired--more than ever--to keep Cuba 
and her proven source of cash. 
 Meanwhile, Cuban slave-sympathizers wore black 
armbands when they learned of President Lincoln's 
assassination in 1865.60  And by 1868, Cuba, herself, was 
engulfed in a grotesque civil war.  The war lasted ten 
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years.  To this day Cubans remember it as the "Ten Years' 
War."61 
 In 1869 Jose Martí suffered arrest in Havana at the 
age of fifteen.  The super sensitive authorities charged 
him with conspiring against Spain.62  In spite of meager 
evidence, the judge sentenced him to six years of hard 
labor in a stone quarry.  Eventually, however, his sentence 
was commuted, and he was exiled to Spain.  But there is 
irony in his arrest and exile.  In Spain, he acquired ideas 
that propelled forward his revolution sentiments.  He, like 
the phoenix, rose. 
 At the outbreak of the Ten Years' War, Cuba and 
Spain's economies relied as much as ever on sugar and 
slaves.63  Cuba's political interests, like her economy, 
revolved around the influential and conservative planter 
class.64 
Cuba's population, however, consisted of a broad 
ideological mix, each with its own agenda.  Common 
sentiment looked to Spain.  Only a few Cubans any longer 
desired annexation by the United States. 
 The conservative planter class began the revolution 
for Cuban independence in 1868.65  Little did they know the 
Pandora's box they opened.  Spain had insulated them as 
much as possible from abolitionists and protected them from 
internal uprisings in the past. 
Party division and union, however, depended on 
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specific issues.  For a rapid settlement, the tricky part 
was, of course, the age-old issue of slavery.  Cuban 
liberals quickly agreed with conservatives' primary desire 
for free trade.  Yet, liberals preferred autonomy (staying 
within the Spanish realm) AND a planned-schedule for 
abolition.  Bankrupt-Spain, of course, did not agree with 
free trade. 
 Autonomy also proved complicated when mixed with 
abolition.  On this issue, conservatives and Spain aligned.  
Their alliance, however, was convoluted: for conservatives 
still yearned--nostalgically, if not blindly--to retain 
slavery.66  Spain, tempered by Continental pressure--at 
least on the surface--sympathized with liberals on the 
slavery issue.67 
 Despite these sympathies, Spain, with a better head 
for business, sided with Cuban conservatives over the 
shrinking supply of slave labor resulting from the outcome 
of the Civil War in the United States.  Slave labor had 
shrunk through (1) attrition; (2) abolitionist-liberals 
buying and setting slaves free; and, (3) runaway slaves. 
 Mixed with the decay of slavery, Cuban conservatives 
wrangled because independent and cantankerous free wage 
earners bellyached about working conditions and human 
rights.  These were the folk who replaced slaves.68  
Ironically, when conservatives called for independence, 
they failed to foresee that these folk, who annoyed them 
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the most, would emerge as liberal leaders and would rapidly 
and enthusiastically seize the chance for reform.69 
 Liberals quickly out-numbered conservatives.70  At this 
juncture, conservatives reconsidered with the mother 
country the genie they had let out of the bottle.71  But it 
was too late.  In only a matter of months from the 
beginning of the revolution--and prompted by conservatives' 
reversal--liberals' ranks (which was a combination of 
blacks and whites) swelled with national pride and shifted 
from desiring autonomy to seeking an all-out independent 
republic.72 
 For ten years these determined revolutionaries fought 
both the well-armed Spanish and the plantation owners' 
private armies with only machetes, torches, and out-dated 
pistols and rifles.  They burned sugar fields to disrupt 
the economy73, which resulted in mass suffering and 
starvation.74  Yet, the insurgents endured and, in large 
part, remained galvanized.  So impressed (and economically 
crippled) were both the Spanish and the Cuban planters that 
in 1878 Spain proposed a treaty.75    
 The Ten Years' War marked the beginning of meaningful 
nationalism and unity among the lower stratum in Cuba and 
produced for the first time a union of Cuban whites and 
blacks fighting for a common cause.76  It also made the 
United States aware that annexation of Cuba was not an easy 
prospect. 
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 President Lincoln was Cuba's first United States hero.  
John Rawlins was Cuba's second.77  In 1869 Rawlins, the 
United States' Secretary of War under President Grant, 
tried in vain--literally from his deathbed--to obtain 
belligerent status for the Cuban revolutionaries.  Instead, 
the United States' Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish--with 
a greedy eye upon Cuba--succeeded where Rawlins failed.78  
He opposed Rawlins’ efforts, a move that no doubt 
guaranteed the future of Martí and his followers in 1895.79 
 The Ten Years' War produced four lasting effects in 
Cuba.  First, was the timed and compensated abolition of 
slavery.80  Second, was the Treaty of Zanjon, which promised 
autonomy with representation in the Cortes81--a promise 
Spain quickly broke in a deception which cost her the 
alliance of hard-line conservatives (and which helped seed 
the Revolution of 1895).82  Third, was the War produced an 
event in Cuban history which quickly became magnified into 
legend, the "Protest of Baragua":83 Antonio Maceo, the Negro 
leader, better known among his countrymen as the "Bronze 
Titan,"84 unequivocally refused to sign the Treaty of Zanjon 
and accepted exile.  Fourth, was the War taught Cubans that 
Spain had not intended to sit at a treaty table except for 
the favoritism shown toward her by the United States.85 
 But the United States had not abandoned its desire to 
absorb Cuba, whether Cubans liked it or not.86  In the 
seventeen intervening years (1878-1895), the United States 
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made various overtures to wheedle Cuba from Spain.87  During 
the same period, Cubans, and other Latin Americans, 
incubated movements to renew the War, only to have their 
plans fall apart for a host of reasons.88  For example, 
Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party decided to shelve 
meticulously financed and organized plans in 1892 and in 
the early months of 1894.89 
 By the end of 1894, however, Cuban revolutionary 
sentiment had reached the flashpoint--with or without 
Martí’s Revolutionary Party.  Martí, on Christmas day, 
1894, decided to link the Party’s war chest with the 
impending revolution.  He prepared to launch a three-
pronged, well-organized and financed, assault into Cuba. 
 
 But Washington got wind of the plan.  On 12 January 
1895 the United States government quickly respected its 
neutrality agreement with Spain and, in full public view, 
impounded three chartered ships.  Customs officials 
confiscated crates of nap-sacks, canteens, sabers, guns, 
and ammunition--just two days before the Party's ships were 
to rendezvous and depart from Fernandina, Florida.90 
Martí planned for the Amadis to go to Costa Rica and 
pick up Maceo; the Baracoa, to sail to Montecristi and 
acquire Gomez; the third, the Lagonda, to steam to Key West 
and provide transport for a Cuban contingent.  Moreover, 
Martí intended for the elaborate assault--and important 
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materiel--to aid Party-sanctioned uprisings in each of 
Cuba's six provinces.91  By all appearances, Martí’s 
revolution ended before it began. 
 Throughout the United States, newspapers devoted 
front-page coverage to the Party's tryst.  This crushed 
Martí’s spirit.92  The Party was also now financially broke.  
Funds (converted into arms)--and mostly collected one penny 
at a time from poor, yet devoted Cuban émigré laborers--
rested behind sealed doors. 
 In so many cases involving Jose Martí an old-homespun 
adage applied: what counted most was not the size of the 
dog in the fight, but the size of the fight in the dog.  
Jose Martí’s revolution had not ended; it had just begun.  
Eyebrows, in admiration and sympathy, raised across the 
United States, indeed, around the world, at the amount of 
stash off-loaded from those ships.  Well-wishers and 
supporters from corners before unheard emerged for this 
little man, this poet, this revolutionary.93  Even the 
United States government paused for a moment as rank and 
file Americans remembered the roots from which they sprang. 
 Staggered, but not broken, Martí regrouped.  His 
determination proved invincible and inspirational.  Faced 
with irreversible momentum in Cuba, and armed only with 
modest resources, Martí’s sole option for influencing Cuban 
independence rested in swift, decisive action.94  In his 
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memoirs of the event, Horatio Rubens recorded: 
 Therefore on January 29, 1895, Martí, and General 
"Mayia" Rodriquez, representing the Commander-in-
Chief, Maximo Gomez, and General Enrique Collazo, 
representing the Island organization, jointly signed 
the order to fight.95 
The official date for the uprising was set for 24 
February 1895, which, according to Rubens, "was selected 
partly because it coincided with the first carnival 
celebration."96  History reflects a more important 
alternative reason: that date allowed Martí time to 
reorganize Maceo and Gomez's entry into Cuba.  On 31 
January Martí departed New York for Gomez's home in 
Montecristi.  He arrived on 7 February.  At some between 
Fernandina in January and Montecristi on 1 April, Jose 
Martí most likely thought, perhaps even uttered--although, 
not written anywhere--that, if need be, he intended to lead 
the invasion and row a boat all the way to Cuba.  Martí, 
skilled neither as a warrior or a sailor, practically did 
both. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DAY FIVE, BANANA-BOAT-BOUND 
 The day before Martí, Gomez, and four insurgents left 
Montecristi to invade Cuba on 1 April 1895, Antonio Maceo 
and twenty-two of his fellow Cuban insurgents were stranded 
on a tiny island in the Bahamas.  With little delay, 
however, they seized a sailboat, killed the captain, and 
crashed on a rocky northern shore of Cuba.  The way he 
invaded Cuba says everything about Antonio Maceo.  But 
historical reports of the assault are at variance. 
 Philip Foner concluded that Maceo "prevailed" to rent 
the sailboat, Honor, at Fortune Island, Bahamas.  This 
proved necessary because the captain of the steamship 
Adirondack supposedly broke his promise to drop Maceo and 
his insurgents as they passed along the Cuban coastline on 
their way from Costa Rica.  Foner, in an endnote, wrote: 
"In the confusion of the landing process the sailor who had 
commanded the boat was shot by one of the Cubans."  
Moreover, Foner appended, "Maceo declared it was an 
accident."1 
 In his memoirs Horatio Rubens painted an even more 
veiled scene than Foner did when he wrote: 
 
A Spanish war vessel was in sight, so the Honor 
was driven ashore on a rocky coast; a wave rising 
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under the stern impelled the craft well up on 
shore.  While Maceo arranged matters with the 
captain, Corona [one of Maceo's men] was most 
unsuitably toying with a rifle.  The weapon 
understandably, if unexpectedly, discharged and 
the bullet killed the captain.2 
Clearly, in Ruben's account, neither Maceo nor Corona 
killed the captain, the bullet did; and, responsibility for 
crashing the Honor rested with the Spanish, who were in the 
right place at the wrong time. 
 Maceo's initial plan was to exit Costa Rica with his 
insurgents disguised as fare-paying migrant field hands.  
"When at sea," Foner wrote, "of course, the announced 
destination would be changed from Central America to 
Cuba."3  Now any captain would consider this a challenge to 
his command.  Nevertheless, Foner's next sentence resumed: 
"If the captain and the crew of the vessel objected, they 
were to be confined until the end of the voyage."4  While 
Foner's reported rationale indeed engenders an image of 
nonviolence, the rationalization in fact fails to answer an 
important question: who is going to drive the Adirondack if 
her Captain and crew are locked up? 
 On 4 April 1895 (dateline: Havana, 3 April) The New 
York Times reported a little less delicate rendition of 
Maceo's invasion: 
 
 There had been trouble between the insurgents and 
the Captain [of the Honor] because he had refused 
to land them at the point designated by them.  
When the Captain refused to yield to their 
threats they killed him and threw his body 
overboard. . . [(Paraphrasing the rest of the 
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column) two of the Honor's crew was captured, but 
Maceo, Crombret and twenty-one insurgents made-
off safely into the hills around Baracoa].5 
Both historians, Foner and Rubens, cited The Times story as 
Spanish propaganda.  Just the same, truth is in the heart 
of the beholder.  The captain and crew of the Brothers may 
have placed some weight in stories such as The Times and 
thus yielded a reason why Martí and Gomez's invasion, 
disguised as a charter, ended so abruptly in Inagua. 
 Gomez's diary indicated the Brothers arrived in Inagua 
at 10 p.m. on 2 April.  The captain went ashore on the 
morning of 3 April to "fix the papers."6  At 6 p.m. of the 
same day he and the crew refused to sail any further, only 
the "cook" remained. 7  Foner and Rubens discounted the 
captain's integrity and blamed him for discouraging the 
crew and possible replacements.  Rubens, unlike Foner, 
however, noted that the captain refunded his $400 fee to 
Martí.8  News of Maceo's invasion almost certainly found 
its way to Matthew Town, which was the logical port for 
Martí and Gomez's arrival in Inagua, Bahamas. 
Decades before, Matthew Town was a bustling port which 
saw the shipment of tons of salt from the island's mines. 
But a slump in the market after the American Civil War 
reduced Matthew Town to a pit-stop harborage for those en 
route to or from the Windward Passage.  Both Inagua 
islands, Great and Little, are desolate and surrounded by 
shoals.9  Therefore, by elimination, the only harbor at 
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either island deep enough for the Brothers and the 
Nordstrand (on which the insurgents departed10) was Matthew 
Town, Great Inagua--forty-six miles northeast of Cuba. 
 Martí made three diary entries on 3 April 1895.  
First, oddly fascinated, he noted "rows of equally spaced 
flamencos, pink-chested with black under-wings flying in 
the heavens of the sky."  Second, as the day went on, he 
wrote a four verse poem describing life's uncertainties.  
His third entry implied that the Captain or crew members 
had revealed to the authorities the nature of the 
insurgents' mission:  "There is for a man nothing worse 
than to have no virtue." 11  But neither Gomez nor Martí’s 
diaries included reasons for why the captain or crew 
disclosed the party's objective.  
 Gomez's entry on 3 April raised significant issues.  
In the morning when Captain Bastian went ashore he told the 
insurgents he intended to register the schooner for their 
"supposed" trip to Nassau.  When the port authorities 
arrived and cursorily inspected the vessel, Gomez noted the 
insurgents were able "to hide the greater number of objects 
which would unveil [their] mission."  However, he had grave 
suspicion of Captain Bastian, writing, "his distrust had 
dawned upon [them]."12 
 Gomez confirmed his suspicion when he wrote that 
"Bastian returned to the boat around 6 p.m. and [had them] 
surrender the revolvers the customs' authorities said they 
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saw."  Moreover, "Bastian divulged two of the three crew 
were sorry and would not continue or return, leaving only 
the faithful cook."13 
Martí wrote that while Bastian apprised them about the 
crew, Customs' Officials were "meticulously inspecting the 
vessel."  Martí noted that had he not gained the Officials' 
confidence, "all of our arms would have been confiscated."14 
Gomez summed up his April 3 entry with the words, "The 
situation was complicated."15  Indeed, the situation was 
very bad. 
 The insurgents charted the Brothers in Gomez's wife's 
name.  Further, the vessel was bare boat chartered, which 
was independent of captain and crew.16  On 4 April Gomez 
summarized the insurgents' predicament: 
 
 We are separated from this unfortunate man 
[Bastian], but we are isolated, with a useless 
boat, without sailors, and in a port whose 
inhabitants deny us shelter.17 
For Gomez and Martí to have rammed into the shoreline 
of Cuba, like Maceo, implied disaster for Gomez's wife and 
family.  To make matters worse, all the insurgents needed 
was to recall that the schooner Brothers, Captain Bastian, 
and Bastian’s hand picked crew was neither their first 
choice, nor expenditure, for departing Montecristi. 
 Getting stuck with Bastian and the Brothers was a 
misadventure in itself.  On 1 April Martí posted a letter 
describing the unusual circumstances to Gonzalo de Quesada 
 85 
 
and Benjamin Guerra in New York (the Cuban Revolutionary 
Party Secretary and Treasurer, respectively).  Martí 
revealed before he fled New York at the end of January that 
he had failed to charter a boat or find a willing captain 
to transport the Montecristi contingent to Cuba. 
Thus, while in Montecristi, he engaged John Poloney, 
yacht broker and captain, "in view of previous service for 
contraband trade" with Dominican rebels.  From Poloney 
Martí chartered the schooner Marijohn in Gomez's wife's 
name for "2,000 Mexican dollars."  He also paid him $500 of 
a $1000 captain fee to sail them to Cuba.18  For reasons 
related to "courage," Poloney and his crew reneged.19 
 Ironically, through Poloney's recommendation, Captain 
Bastian emerged.  Bastian, however, refused to sail the 
Marijohn.  Instead, he held out for the Brothers.  So, for 
"$700 in gold," Martí chartered the Brothers, once again--
from Poloney.  Martí, unable to get a refund for the 
Marijohn or the captain's fee, assured Quesada and Guerra 
of Poloney's service in the future.20  Double-crossed, Martí 
and Gomez set their course for Cuba. 
When it became apparent by 4 April in Matthew Town 
that Bastian and two of the three crew had jumped ship 
Martí went ashore to "solve the problem."21  His diary 
reflected the poverty of Matthew Town and the beautiful 
natural surroundings.22  His purpose ashore, however, proved 
modestly successful. 
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 Bastian reportedly tagged along while Martí tried in 
vain to recruit sailors: Bastian "poisoned their will to 
accept the office he had declined."23  Martí succeeded in 
befriending the Haitian Consul, M. Sarber, who confidently 
recommended they seek help from a "smuggler" called 
"Hopkins," the self-proclaimed "captain of the port."24  
 Hopkins emerged in Martí’s narrative a larger than 
life character: "a copper-colored, big-bellied, well-
dressed, courteous young man with a noble soul."  Hopkins 
boasted "he would sail anywhere if paid enough," because 
"he was the father of two families, blessed with two 
wives," yet, peculiarly enough, a "loyal soul."  In spite 
of these credentials, Martí struck a deal with him.  But 
Hopkins shortly reneged.  Martí blamed Bastian.  Hopkins, 
"hat in hand," sought to ease the blow of discouragement 
and, as an appeasement, gave Martí "an earthenware bottle 
of gin."25  Unlike others, however, Hopkins stopped short of 
helping himself to the insurgents' funds. 
 Martí had real concerns that the revolutionaries' 
whereabouts were too obvious.  By the third day they should 
have been in the Cuban interior.  He correctly surmised 
their absence in Montecristi portended dreadful 
consequences: "Once warned, Spain could besiege us in 
Inagua, the unfortunate island without exit."26 
In fact, Spain was at the very moment on the lookout 
for them.  The Spanish Vice-consul in Montecristi had wired 
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Cuba with details of the expedition, which he had purchased 
for ten pesos.27 
 But Martí and his followers were not without allies.  
The Mayor of Montecristi insisted they departed for Haiti.  
To confuse matters more, and suspecting interception of his 
message, he wired the Dominican Consul in Cuba apologizing 
that he had not impeded Martí and Gomez's departure for 
Santiago.28  Regarding Haiti, though, little did the Mayor 
know, but it would soon be the revolutionaries’ hideout. 
 Meanwhile, the Spanish had a poorly protected Cuban 
coastline.  On 3 April The New York Times summarized their 
ineffectiveness: 
 
 The Spanish gunboats are watching as large an 
extent of the coast as they can, but there are 
not many of them, and there will be many chances 
to elude their observation.29 
Specifically, the New York Herald on 1 April printed: 
 
 The steamer Mascotte arrived at noon today from 
Jamaica.  Her officers reported that she almost 
circled the Island of Cuba, going south by Cape 
Maysi [approximately where Martí and Gomez landed 
on 11 April] and returning by Cape San Antonio, 
but at no time was a Spanish war ship sighted.  
They report the Cuban coast very poorly guarded 
and that nothing like a cordon or blockade is 
being maintained.30 
 That Spain, herself, was aware of the deficiency the 
Times (London) recognized when on 11 March Madrid reported, 
"six cruisers and nine gunboats [were] being sent to Cuban 
waters."31  On 28 March the New-York Daily Tribune reported, 
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"the torpedo gunboats Fillpinas and the Martin Allonzo 
Pinzon and the cruiser Castillia received orders to proceed 
with all possible speed to Cuban waters."32  The news 
article did not indicate that the vessels had arrived. 
 Cubans were not without a reply to Spain's 
reinforcement, The Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville) 
reported on 2 April: 
 
 A prominent eastern shipbuilding firm has agreed 
to furnish the insurgents a torpedo boat at an 
early day which will be used to destroy the 
Spanish war vessels now cruising in Cuban 
waters.33 
 Spain's naval presence in Cuba was, in fact, 
embarrassingly evident.  On 13 March the New York Herald 
reported (as did newspapers throughout the entire country 
and most of the world) that a Spanish gunboat fired on an 
American steamship, the Allianca, in the Windward Passage.34  
Before that example cooled (for the Times (London) was 
still reporting the "affair" on 1 April35) a Spanish gunboat 
"fired at the British steamship Ethelred off of Cape Maysi 
in the Windward Passage" on 3 April.36 
 The New York Herald, in a sub-story about the British 
ship, discussed the important fact that Spain claimed a 
six-mile territorial limit, contrary to the internationally 
accepted three-mile limit.  Thus, Spain had real concerns 
about Cuban international assistance and her own 
ineffectiveness at bottling-up the island as result of her 
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shortage of vessels for short coastal sprints. 
 So, against the backdrop of Maceo's deadly foray three 
days earlier, and on the day after the Ethelred incident, 
Jose Martí toiled 46 miles away to replace a captain and 
crew aboard a slow sailing boat to Cuba.  "Upon 
Providence," Gomez invoked, the insurgents had cast 
themselves when they departed Montecristi.37  Whether they 
were uncourageous or stopped by the hand of God, Martí 
persuaded no sailors to transport them aboard the Brothers. 
 The authorities at Matthew Town were justifiably 
anxious, because, technically, England and Spain were 
allies.  At any time a Spanish vessel could have entered 
the harbor and no difficulty existed for them to obtain 
informants interested in earning a quick peso.  Departing 
Inagua was imperative for the insurgents. 
 Gomez concluded succinctly on 4 April that a German 
fruit ship bound for bananas in Cape Haitian had arrived in 
port at 2 p.m.  Again, with the help of the Haitian Consul, 
M. Sarber, the insurgents arranged with Captain Loewe, 
skipper of the Nordstrand, to take passage.  Sarber also 
agreed to arrange for the return of the schooner Brothers 
to Poloney in Montecristi.38 
According to Martí, Sarber agreed to safeguard their 
materiel--himself, a “smuggler.” 39  He stamped their 
passports.40 
 Gomez recorded on 5 April only that the German 
 90 
 
steamship departed at 6 p.m.  Once again, placing their 
confidence in “Providence,” they arranged to disembark in 
Cuba.41  When and where was not mentioned. 
Martí, on the other hand, waxed eloquently about a 
freighter bearing balsa wood from Mobile; happy workers who 
sang while offloading her; and, the turquoise sea.  
Finally, he memorialized the attitude and even appearance 
of the loyal cook, "David, of the Turks Islands," noting, 
in particular, the exquisite supper he cooked for the 
insurgents' last night in Inagua.42 
 The Nordstrand, bound for bananas in Haiti, departed 
on 5 April with the insurgents.  They paid Captain Loewe 
$1,000.  The Nordstrand backtracked the course they had 
sailed only five days earlier. 
Gomez recorded on 6 April that the insurgents arrived 
at 4 p.m.43  They were now, once again, on the island of 
Hispaniola, less than 37 miles from their point of 
beginning. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DAY EIGHT, FAMILIAR VIEWS 
 
 When Jose Martí and Maximo Gomez and four insurgents 
retreated on 5 April 1895, some thought "Providence"1 had 
had a hand.  Stranded in Inagua by the captain and crew of 
the Brothers, Martí and his companions--left high, dry, and 
vulnerable--felt like victims in a rising flood.  Martí, 
however, was not the sort to wait for providential 
intervention.  He was proactive, and a rescue vessel 
steamed into harbor at 10:00 a.m. on 4 April 1895. 
 The Nordstrand was a two-year-old 210-foot double-
bottomed steel vessel built to Lloyd's specifications in 
Hamburg, Germany.  She carried Lloyd's most prestigious 
ocean-going rating, +100A1, a state of the art triple 
expansion reciprocating steam engine provided her power.2  
The ship had departed from Jamaica on her way for bananas 
in Cape Haitian.  Instead of Inagua, the captain could just 
as easily have sailed east around the northwest point of 
Hispaniola from the Windward Passage and steamed straight 
for Cape Haitian.  For no particular reason, Captain Loewe 
chose otherwise, and this proved fortunate for the 
revolutionaries.  The Nordstrand removed them from harm’s 
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way twice as fast as the Brothers had sailed them into it. 
 Neither Gomez’s nor Martí’s diary, or any of Martí’s 
letters, indicated Captain Loewe agreed to transport them 
to Cuba while he was in Inagua.  Gomez's diary states as 
much: 
 At six o'clock on the afternoon of 5 April, 
placing our confidence in providence, we left 
aboard a German steamship.  Finally, on board the 
ship, we arranged with the Captain to disembark 
in Cuba.3  
 
 In Inagua Captain Loewe probably bargained for no more 
than simply to transport six desperate passengers to Cape 
Haitian, a perfectly legitimate deal.  First, Captain Loewe 
surely knew of the insurgents' prime intention, aware that 
Martí had already exhausted all opportunities on the island 
to recruit a new captain and crew to sail them to Cuba 
aboard the Brothers.  Also, Captain Bastian, according to 
Martí, had thoroughly soured the islander's minds.  Captain 
Loewe, thinking like a steward of a ship--and, in fairness, 
even like Bastian--initially hesitated.  His first reason 
centered on the hubbub surrounding Maceo's murderous 
invasion only five days earlier.  Also, the Spanish had 
fired on the English merchant ship, Elthered, on 2 April in 
the area Martí and Gomez intended to visit.  News of 
stories like either of those traveled quickly from port to 
port--especially a busy port that lay but a few miles away 
from both occurrences. 
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 While some captains lowered their standards for money, 
allowing armed insurgents on board on short notice seemed 
(if money alone were the issue) beyond Martí’s and Gomez's 
budget.  Another strategy emerged. 
 Martí and Gomez and their followers sought simply to 
get away from Inagua.  Loewe provided the opportunity.  The 
six also realized, if they intended to achieve phase two of 
the strategy, that they had to be on their very best 
behavior on the leg to Hispaniola.  Good manners were a 
must. 
Martí recorded the likely time and place he struck the 
deal with Captain Loewe for transportation to Cuba.  On 6 
April, while in route to Cape Haitian, Martí visited 
Captain Loewe's quarters, which he described in some 
detail: 
 The Captain's berth was constructed of rich 
mahogany and was like the basin of a fountain.  
The berth covered the drawers, which were full of 
charts.  On the mantle piece above the desk, 
among magazines, newspapers and navigational 
aids, was the complete collection of Goethe and a 
novel by Gaudy.  Presiding over his berth was the 
portrait of his wife, large boned, and as sweet 
looking as crystallized [hard] sugar-candy.  In a 
corner was a collection of weapons: a hunting 
shotgun, two large daggers, a pistol, and two 
sets of manacles, chains, and shackles, toward 
which, the Captain indicated, "sometimes those 
are needed for the sailors."  Along side his 
wife's picture was a woolen yarn embroidery, 
"embroidered by my wife," he said.  It read, in 
[German] Gothic letters: 
 
 "In All Storms, 
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 In All Distress, 
 May He Protect You, 
 The True God."4 
 
 There were no witnesses to Martí’s conversation.  
Fluent in German, Martí had no problem conversing with the 
Captain.  One can only conjecture at the dialogue between 
them and wonder how Gomez might have rendered it.  Gomez 
did note, however, when the Nordstrand arrived at Cape 
Haitian at four o'clock in the afternoon, on 6 April, "[we] 
scattered among people so not to be noticed."5 
 Gomez reported later that he found "asylum with Mr. 
Mercier, an associate of Dr. Dellundé."  Both had supported 
Cuban freedom fighters.  Gomez wrote further that "Marcos 
del Rosario, the Dominican [and faithful aid] remained by 
his side," and went on, "I have been treated with the most 
exquisite amiability by this excellent man.  The other 
companions, Jose Martí, Francisco Borrero, Angel Guerra, 
and Cesar Salas, lodged in different houses of friends."  
Gomez wrote, of the 7th and 8th, "the same and no news to 
report."6 
 Besides Martí’s and Gomez's there is extant another 
first person account of the overall journey and, more 
specifically, the layover in Cape Haitian.  Marcos del 
Rosario, General Gomez's aid, talked about it forty years 
later.  His recollections appeared in a collection of 
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memoirs compiled by Cuba's Ministry of Culture.7  Marcos 
claimed the revolutionaries originally intended to sail to 
Key West, presumably, to take on board more insurgents.  He 
offered no reason why they stopped in Inagua; however, as a 
stopping spot along the way, Inagua was perfectly 
reasonable. 
 Captain Bastian went ashore at Inagua "to clear the 
Brothers for Nassau."  No doubt Bastian intended to create 
worthwhile cover if the band subsequently sailed for Key 
West or Cuba.  Also, Marcos possibly made reference to the 
original Fernandina plan, which had instructions for Martí 
to board the Baracoa.  In that event, Martí intended to 
sail first from Fernandina to Montecristi and meet Gomez's 
insurgents, to include Marcos.  Then, once together, the 
plan likely included sailing plans to Key West and to 
recruit additional forces before heading to Cuba.  
Regardless of Marcos’ intent, he dismissed Bastian as, "the 
damn captain of the schooner. . . a coward."8 
 Marcos provided valuable information about the 
insurgents' layover in Cape Haitian.  He said Gomez 
"pretended to be ill, though nothing at all was wrong with 
him; he became a patient.  Taken to "Dr. Dellundé, a 
medical friend of the Cubans," Marcos continued, "[I] did 
not see either the Doctor or the Doctor's young female 
servant [Lola] again; Martí and the others remained 
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hidden."9  The precise hideouts of Francisco Borrero, Angel 
Guerra, and Cesar Salas remain a mystery. 
 In contrast to Gomez's account, Martí was evasive.  He 
did not refer to any business arrangement with Captain 
Loewe, the whereabouts of his companions, or even who they 
were.  From a practical view his rationale was sensible--if 
what he wrote fell into the wrong hands.  Martí passed the 
time in Cape Haitian writing about the goings-on outside 
his bedroom window. 
 On Sunday, 7 April, Martí wrote that he enjoyed a 
"strong, dark, black [cup of] coffee" while "fresh sunlight 
ascended on the other side of the window blinds."   Below 
was "the neighborhood street market” where people "toiled" 
and danced the "chacharea."  Street "merchants barked their 
wares, and fruit vendors sold star apples."  Martí "sat 
with his back to the window writing" and "heard the 
ruffling of a "petticoat" and the "dragging of slippers on 
the cobblestone street."10 
 In the "distance" there were "tambourines and 
trumpets" and, lo, the "rain of yesterday had cleared," and 
"this was one of God's good days."  There was the sound of 
"a cane on the sidewalk" and an "eloquent one preaching 
religion [in French]."  Martí’s translation, albeit, 
interpretation, conveyed an ardent political message quite 
like his own zeal for Cuban freedom.  This drew Martí to 
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the window where he reported seeing a host of colorful 
people.  There were boys laughing and beating drums.  There 
was also a middle-aged woman dressed in her Sunday's-best, 
a hat, and around whose shoulders draped a shawl.  In her 
"fine booties," she daintily "leaped over some muddy 
water," carrying a "Book of Devotions."11 
 Finally, Martí described a "strapping young fellow in 
a pink tie, pants of pearl, and sporting an ivory fist 
cane."  Martí dislodged from his diary “two soiled cards."  
On the "smaller" he had written "Mlle. Elise Etienne, Cape 
Haitian," and on the larger, "Mr. Edmond Ferere."12  Martí 
made no reference regarding their involvement with Cuban 
freedom or the insurgents' layover in Cape Haitian.  Also, 
elsewhere, there did not appear any historical reference 
about them.  Perhaps they had a connection with the 
whereabouts of Gomez and Marcos's hideout or even that of 
the other three insurgents. 
 Martí made two diary entries on 8 April.  His first 
contained an analogy to Cuba's struggle for independence 
with the North American Indians' "assimilation" and 
inevitable "cultural meltdown."  He empathized with the 
Indians' "resistance," servitude, "emancipation," 
indoctrination, and subsequent "natural disappearance."  
Martí linked their extinction with Cuban's lack of well 
being and imminent fate.  Martí’s second entry echoed the 
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theme of his first but in more detail.  He concluded his 8 
April entry with glowing praise for "Tom, from St. Thomas, 
a loyal black servant of Dr. Dellunde's," who shuttled 
books back and forth for him from a "Haitian bookstore down 
on the corner."13  
 Meanwhile, guessing the whereabouts of Martí and Gomez 
was an interesting pastime for the western press.  By 8 
April the press had incorrectly reported Martí and Gomez 
had invaded Cuba no less than a dozen times.  As early as 
February 26 the New York Herald concluded, "the news 
received last night from Cuba tells that [Martí and Gomez] 
have landed, for their arrival was to be the signal for the 
uprising."14  On the 27th, the Herald elaborated: "Martí 
left New York by the last San Domingo steamer about January 
22, and he and General Gomez have landed in Cuba from San 
Domingo with a small band of leaders."15 
 William Randolph Hearst's San Francisco Examiner 
offered its own version of the invasion on the 27th:  
"Generals Martí and Gomez are at the head of the 
revolution.  They reached the island from Vera Cruz, 
Mexico, on the 24th."16  That Martí attained the rank of 
"general" surely came as a surprise to some people.  Hiding 
in Haiti in April, Martí and Gomez undoubtedly wished those 
first two stories were true. 
    Those stories only marked the beginning of speculation.  
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On 28 February reporters for the New York Herald and The 
New York Times reversed themselves and printed "[dateline:] 
Havana, Feb. 27, 1895.--The report that Generals Maximo 
Gomez and Jose Martí, the exiled revolutionary leaders, 
have landed in Cuba is absolutely untrue."17  But that did 
not end speculation.  If anything, it fueled it.  The next 
day, 1 March, The Florida Times-Union reported, "Tuesday's 
issue of El Pals ([Madrid's] government organ) confirms the 
report of the arrival on Cuban soil of General Martí and 
Maximo Gomez.  It says that they are now in the 
neighborhood of Matanzas."18 
 On 15 March the Tampa Morning Tribune went further.  
"FRESH FROM CUBA: A provisional government had absolutely 
been organized and. . . General Martí was its president 
[and] General Gomez. . .  chief of the army.  The Cuban 
forces number 8,000 men all armed and equipped."19  If true, 
in February and March, it certainly would have pleased the 
insurgents, who, of course, in April, had scattered 
throughout Cape Haitian, waiting, and surely were wondering 
if Captain Loewe of the Nordstrand intended to fulfill his 
bargain.  But on 15 March the revolutionaries were still in 
Montecristi and had as yet not even met Captain Bastian of 
the Brothers.  
 The New York Herald, showing more restraint than usual 
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in reporting Martí and Gomez sightings, waited until 21 
March before it declared--again, "Cuban Patriots Land":  
"General Maximo Gomez Said to Have Reached Puerto del Padre 
with 200 Men."20 
Then, on 29 March, the Herald actually came closer 
than ever to getting the story right: "[reporting] What the 
Spanish Say; Martí and Gomez are at Montecristi, San 
Domingo, and Maceo is at Costa Rica."21   
Yet, on the same day as the Herald's reversal, 29 
March, the New York Tribune printed, "Maximo Gomez. . . 
presence in Cuba is confirmed, and he is now at the head of 
the uprising at Puerto Principe."22  On that day, Gomez, in 
Montecristi, had just chartered a second yacht in his 
wife's name, and Antonio Maceo, in the Bahamas, was 
preparing to steal a sailboat.  
 On 31 March the Herald once more proclaimed, 
"INSURGENT VICTORY, [smaller headline] Maximo Gomez Is Now 
Contemplating a General Advance Upon the Province of Puerto 
Principe."  And, from Madrid, the Herald reported, "Maceo 
has arrived in Jamaica."23  About the time the Herald's 
story was rolling off its presses Martí and Gomez were 
likely asking Gomez's wife, sisters, and daughter to 
prepare food for their trip to Inagua.  Also, Maceo by then 
had already crashed the Honor into a rocky Cuban shore and, 
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with his band, was scrambling through the thickets seeking 
cover in Cuba. 
 On 1 April the Herald turned around, again.  It quoted 
a Tampa source: "No official notice of the presence of 
Martí and Gomez has been made, and if they are on the 
island their presence is still kept secret."24  In contrast, 
the Times (London) reported, 3 April, "that Maceo and Gomez 
have succeeded in landing on the island is officially 
confirmed."25 
 Suddenly, on 6 April, stories in The New York Times 
and the New York Daily Tribune proved frighteningly 
accurate.  The Times' headline read, "GOMEZ AWAITS AN 
ENGLISH VESSEL"26 and went on to add what the Tribune said.  
The Tribune’s headline read:  "CUBAN REBELS DISPERSED, 
General Gomez Said to be in Haiti, Waiting to Get Across to 
Cuba."27  Both stories included alarming facts.  Such as, 
"General Gomez, the insurgent chief, is awaiting on the 
north coast of Haiti an English vessel which is to convey 
him to Cuba [italics added]."  Only the bit about the 
"English vessel" was incorrect--the vessel was German. 
 The New York Times reported: "The announcement of the 
Haitian Government that Gens. Gomez and Martí would be 
arrested and imprisoned if found in the Black Republic is 
looked upon rather quizzically by patriots here."  While 
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probably accurate that the Haitian government's true 
position was contrary to its words, a premium nevertheless 
existed for information to lead Spanish forces to Martí and 
Gomez.  Considering that Spanish spies indeed existed, a 
noose, in fact, tightened as the insurgents arrived on that 
very day, 6 April, in Cape Haitian.  Martí’s and Gomez's 
whereabouts could only have been disclosed from sources in 
Inagua--unless, of course, the newspaper reports were 
simply good guesses. 
 The insurgents prepared to leave Haiti on 9 April.  
Gomez wrote in his diary: "I went to Dr. Dellunde's house 
at eight o'clock in the night, at nine o'clock we embarked 
for the same German steamship."  They spent the night 
aboard the Nordstrand.  Gomez wrote on 10 April, 
 We awoke still in port [at Cape Haitian].  The 
Captain informed us that the steamship would not 
be able to leave until after twelve.  Aboard the 
steamship we left at two o'clock in the afternoon 
[10 April]--bound for Inagua to leave twenty-five 
workers; from there [the Nordstrand] would 
immediately set course for Port Antonio, 
Jamaica.28 
 
 Martí, on 9 April, wrote neither about method nor 
means regarding the journey.  Instead, he observed Dr. 
Dellunde's female servant: "Lola. . . crying on the 
balcony.  We embarked."  On 10 April, he wrote, "We 
departed the Cape.  At daybreak [11 April] we arrived in 
Inagua.  Heightened vigilance."29 
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 On 11 April, Gomez provided the answer to future 
curiosities.  Like Martí, he wrote they arrived and awoke 
in Inagua.  But, he elaborated, "the task of putting the 
workers ashore was done immediately."  Then, he added, "the 
rowboat we had bought for 100 pesos was brought aboard [the 
Nordstrand]."30  Apparently, the insurgents had already 
decided to row into Cuba from the Nordstrand, either before 
departing Inagua for Cape Haitian on 6 April or while in 
Inagua on 11 April.  In either case, the rowboat was not an 
after-thought while on board the Nordstrand as she steamed 
close in Cuban waters.  The rowboat, at the very least, was 
a contingency.  Purchasing it also proved how determined 
they were. 
 Martí, in a 15 April letter to Quesada and Guerra, the 
Revolutionary Party's secretary and treasurer in New York 
(whom he wrote after reaching the interior of Cuba), 
briefly alluded to the "good rowboat" they "purchased from 
Barbes" (the Haitian Consul) in Inagua.  Yet, his allusion 
left some doubt as to the purchase date and said nothing of 
its price.  But, his letter recapped the journey and, in 
particular, reflected on good and bad captains, Bastian and 
Loewe, respectively. It also glossed over the 
revolutionaries’ unsuccessful and high priced charter 
boats.  It noted also the critical role Barber played--who 
still possessed in his warehouse a large quantity of the 
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insurgents' arms and ammunition.31 
 Gomez included in his diary that the Nordstrand left 
Inagua at two o'clock in the afternoon on 11 April bound 
for Jamaica.  By four o'clock "we could see the mountains 
of Cuba on the horizon."  At eight o'clock "we were three 
miles off the south coast of Cuba, not very far from the 
Port of Guantanamo."32  Martí and Gomez doubtless felt they 
had traveled a circumnavigator course to get there; 
finally, they were close. 
There has never lived a seaman who after finishing a 
voyage hasn't had something to say about the weather.  And 
there is nothing like bad weather to season the 
uninitiated.  Gomez reflected, "the night was gloomy, the 
sea was agitated, and the clouds seemed like a black 
funeral mantle wrapping and obscuring where we had to 
go."33 
 Gomez described perfectly the first stages of a 
Caribbean squall.  In defense of Captain Loewe's decision 
to off-load the insurgents in their rowboat, it bears 
pointing out that where a squall will go--a seasoned sailor 
can attest--is anybody's guess.  As likely as it is to hit 
you, it can miss you.  But, if it hits--in what honestly 
feels like a swift moment--temperature and winds viciously 
change from warm, eery calm, into cold, mile-a-minute 
blasts and the sea transforms into seven-foot steel walls 
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of water.  The experience is unforgettable.  The 
Nordstrand, like any vessel, was vulnerable.  Caught in a 
squall, she risked loosing steerage, or even worse, power.  
That close to shore portended her doom.  A rowboat could at 
least bob about. 
 Martí’s and Gomez's version of the upcoming chaos 
appeared in chapter three.  The account from Marcos del 
Rosario now warrants a turn: 
 The [Nordstrand] left us in the sea and a storm 
was brewing.  The night was very dark.  None of 
us knew what to do or how to swim.  Martí held 
the compass of the boat and the General [Gomez] 
the rudder.  Waves battered us, the rudder tore 
off, and the sea carried it away.  Moreover, the 
sea took away the duffel bag containing the 
General's things.  The sea was terrible.  The 
night grew darker.  We could not see anything.  
Then we saw some lights far away.  We believed 
they were Spanish troops; but they were 
fishermen.  We fought with the sea that wanted to 
swallow us.  It did not want us to land on the 
ground in Cuba.  Finally, we saw the end of our 
journey, cliffs, then a headland.  We hit and 
bounced.  I climbed out; Martí followed and took 
my arm, and afterwards, General Gomez and the 
others.  General Gomez jumped on one of the rocks 
on the beach; when he saw the firm ground, the 
end of the trip! he kissed the ground and crowed 
like a rooster!  I tell you, he crowed like a 
rooster, and I said to myself, we are saved!  
After what we had come through I believed we 
could do anything.  And Martí was very happy. 
 I did not know what we were going to do. We 
left the boat and began to walk, and later we 
found a road.34 
 
 Martí and Gomez and their companions had finally 
arrived in Cuba.  It took them eleven days to zigzag more 
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than 450 miles.  What they did not know was worldwide 
political sympathy had grown.  The Times (London) printed 
the following Philadelphia byline:  "The Senate of Florida 
has adopted a resolution extending sympathy and 
encouragement to the Cuban insurgents.--Our 
Correspondent.”35 
 The reason for the growing sympathy had its roots in 
Spanish strong-arm tactics.  On 12 April--the first full 
day Martí and Gomez were in Cuba--a Herald’s headline read:  
"HAVANA A VOLCANO; Wholesale Arrests by the Spanish 
Continue, Many of Them Being Made Merely on Suspicion."36  
With a Madrid dateline of the 12th, the Times (London) 
reported a rare, new kind of grief:  "The customary holy-
week procession at Havana has been prohibited."  And the 
Herald carried the following from Tampa, dateline, 12 
April: 
 No particulars are known here of the arrest of 
members of a baseball team in Havana.  It was a 
local nine going to play ball in the suburbs of 
Havana, and a passenger on the steamer from Cuba 
last night brought a rumor of their arrest on 
suspicion that they were insurgents.37 
 
 As auspicious as their arrival was for Cuban freedom, 
it unfortunately marked for most of them the beginning of 
the end.  In less than three fortnights Martí lay dead, 
gunned down by the Spanish while making his way through the 
mountains near Dos Rios.  He intended to leave the island 
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and return to the United States where he had proven himself 
an effective organizer and fund-raiser.  And, hardly two 
months later, on 17 July, Francisco Borrero died near the 
town of Altagracia in a railway raid with Gomez.38 
 Historical records have not surfaced concerning Cesar 
Salas and Angel Guerra.  Martí recorded the last mention of 
them on 14 April.  On that evening Guerra built a sleeping 
structure from palm fronds for Martí and himself to sleep 
under while they bivouacked in the lush tropical Cuban 
jungle.  Salas, on that evening, "mended" Martí’s belt.  
Absent references about them in other records, they 
apparently perished in combat like Borrero, except their 
deaths failed to rate even so much as a footnote.  Only 
Gomez and his trusted aide, Marcos del Rosario, survived 
the Cuban Revolution.  Gomez died a peaceful death in Cuba 
in 1905.  And Rosario outlived Gomez by 42 years and died 
in his sleep in Cuba at the age of 82 in 1947. 
 But thoughts of relief and celebration, during the 
night and in the early morning of the insurgents' arrival 
in Cuba, banished thoughts of gloom.  By 14 April, news of 
Martí and Gomez's invasion had reached official circles.  
On 15 April (dateline, Havana, 14 April) the New York 
Herald finally got its story right: "GOMEZ IS IN CUBA, JOSE 
MARTI IS WITH HIM." 
 In an ironic twist of fate, the story captured to 
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perfection why Martí enjoyed the reputation he had and 
portended the foundation of his future legacy.  The 
Herald's story, reading as much like a eulogy as a profile, 
summarized for the ages what Jose Martí meant to Greater 
America: 
 He is, perhaps, the greatest literary man living 
in Spanish-America.  As a poet, prose writer and 
orator he has few equals.  He organized the 
Cubans in foreign countries into the Cuban 
revolutionary party, and the present revolution 
is his work.  He will probably be the head of the 
provisional government. 
  Martí is of medium height and slight build, 
having a magnificent head, a spacious forehead, 
dreamy eyes and a heavy black mustache.  He is a 
man of tremendous energy and activity.39 
 
 Jose Martí fell in battle on 19 May 1895.  He 
summarized his own life in an unfinished letter, reportedly 
written on the day before he died: 
  It is my duty. . .to prevent, by the independence 
of Cuba, the United States from spreading over 
the West Indies and falling, with that added 
weight, upon other lands of our America. . .I 
have lived inside the monster and know its 
insides--and my weapon is only the slingshot of 
David.40 
 
 Martí inspired others.  Neither the movement for nor 
the story of Cuban Independence ended with Martí’s death.  
And, in 1895 (through 1902), the United States did not 
emerge as the acquisitive villain Martí had feared.  
Compassion and sympathy for Cuban Independence simply went 
wild in the United States.  The mood emerged in a range-war 
of sorts between rival publishers Joseph Pulitzer and 
 112 
William Randolph Hearst.  Each vied to out do the other for 
supreme newspaper circulation, and neither let the truth 
about Cuban matters interfere. 
 Martí’s unfinished letter included a retrospect of his 
arrival in Cuba: "I arrived in a boat with General Maximo 
Gomez and four others.  I was in charge of the lead oar 
during a storm, and we landed at an unknown quarry on one 
of our beaches."41 
 Martí’s legacy has continued in extraordinary ways, 
one of them in a song.  In 1959 Pete Seeger produced 
Guantanamera, an incredible folk ballad.  He adapted it 
from a Cuban melody of the 1930s based on one of Martí’s 
poems, Ismaelillo.  Pete Seeger gave credit to Jose Martí 
on the label.  Later on, Joan Baez, Arlo Guthrie, and Bob 
Dylan--to name only a few--also produced renditions.  It is 
a beautiful song, and while its title might not be familiar 
to everyone, the melody surely is.  Overall, it has ranked 
as one of the most performed songs of all time.42  The first 
four lines, in Spanish, come straight from Martí’s first 
stanza: 
 Yo soy un hombre sincero 
 De donde crecen las palmas, 
 Y antes de morirme quiero 
 Echar mis versos del alma. 
 
 [I am an honest man 
 From where the palms grow 
 Before I die I want my soul, 
 To shed its poetry]. 
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Martí wrote the poem in solitude in 1891 in the 
Catskill Mountains of New York while he prepared to 
represent Uruguay at the International Monetary Congress in 
Washington.43  Through the years this poem has emerged as 
his most famous.  There is little wonder why.  For the poem 
makes the presence of Martí palpable.  His passion for 
freedom, devotion toward others, and intellect are 
genuinely felt.  Martí was mortal.  But his compassion 
endures: 
 My manly heart conceals 
 The pain it suffers; sons of 
 A land enslaved live for it 
 Silently, and die. 
 
 I understand, keep still, 
 Cast off the versifier's pomp, 
 And hang my doctoral robes upon 
 A withered tree.44 
Jose Martí’s "passage to war"45 was apparently inevitable. 
 114 
NOTES 
Chapter Six 
                                                        
1
.  Gomez, Diario, 286. 
2
.  Lloyd's, Register of British and Foreign Shipping, Vol. 
1, Steamers, 1895-6 (London: Lloyd’s Register, 1895-6), 
“Nor.” 
3
.  Gomez, Diario, 286. 
4
.  Martí, Obras Completas, Vol. 19, 210. 
5
.  Gomez, Diario, 287. 
6
.  Ibid., 286. 
7
.  Martí, Obras Y Vida, 203. 
8
.  Ibid. 
9
.  Ibid. 
 
10
.  Martí, Obras Completas, Vol. 19, 211. 
 
11
.  Ibid. 
 
12
. Ibid. 
 
13
   Martí, Obras Completas, Vol. 19, 212. 
 
14
.  "Exiled Leaders Land," New York Herald, 26 February 
1895. 
15
.  "Have Faith in Gomez," New York Herald, 27 February 
1895. 
16
.  "Battle for Cuba's Freedom," San Francisco, Examiner, 
27 February 1895. 
17
.  "Cuban Provinces in a State of War; Discredits the 
Reports; Denies that Martí and Gomez Have Landed--," New 
York Herald, 28 February 1895.  "Gomez and Martí are 
Invisible," The New York Times February 1895. 
18
.  "Spain is Now Scared," Jacksonville, Florida Times-
Union, 1 March 1895. 
 115 
                                                                                                                                                                  
19
.  “FRESH FROM CUBA,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 15 March 
1895. 
20
.  “Cuban Patriots Land,” New York Herald, 21 March 1895. 
21
.  “What the Spanish Say,” New York Herald, 29 March 1895. 
22
.  "Rushing Troops to Cuba, Spain May Send 100,000 Men," 
New York Tribune, 29 March 1895. 
23
.  “INSURGENT VICTORY,” New York Herald, 31 March 1895. 
24
.  "Cuban Rebels Gaining Ground," New York Herald, 1 April 
1895. 
25
.  "The Revolt in Cuba,” The Times (London), 5 April 1895. 
26
.  “GOMEZ AWAITS AN ENGLISH VESSEL,” The New York Times, 6 
April 1895. 
27
.  “CUBAN REBELS DISPERSED,” New York Daily Tribune, 6 
April 1895. 
28
.  Gomez, Diario, 286. 
29
.  Martí, Obras Completas, Vol. 19, 215. 
30
.  Gomez, Diario, 327. 
 
31
.   Martí, Obras Completas, Vol. 7, 206. 
 
32
.   Gomez, Diario, 327. 
 
33
.  Ibid. 
 
34
.  Martí, Obras Y Vida, 203. 
35
.  "The Revolt in Cuba," The Times (London), 13 April 
1895. 
36.  “HAVANA A VOLCANO,” New York Herald, 12 April 1895. 
 
37
.  "Ball Players in Trouble," New York Herald, 13 April 
1895. 
38
.  Rubens, Liberty, 115. 
39
.  “GOMEZ IS IN CUBA, JOSE MARTÍ IS WITH HIM,” New York 
 116 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Herald, 15 April 1895. 
40
.  Foner, Cuba, v. II, 359. 
41
.  Foner, ed. and Randall trans., Martí, Our America, 442. 
42
.  Benjamin Filene, Romancing the Folk: Public Memory & 
American Roots Music (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000), 297; Pete Seeger, The World of Pete 
Seeger (NY: Columbia, 1973 [sound recording]); Smithsonian 
Folkways World Music Collection (Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian, 1997 [sound recording]). 
43
.  Foner, ed. and Randall trans., Martí, Inside the 
Monster, 44. 
44
.  Foner, ed. and Randall trans., Martí, “I am an honest 
man,” Major Poems, 58. 
45
.  Jose Martí, “Letter to the Editor,” New York Evening 
Post, 25 March 1889. 
 117 
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Jose Martí’s impact on Cuba's struggle for 
independence proved essential.  After the Ten Years' War 
Cubans quickly became convinced that an amicable, long 
term, reconciliation with Spain was unlikely and 
unprofitable.  Spain continued her all too familiar course 
of political and economic drift.  She delayed, and then 
reneged, on promises to Cubans for representation in the 
Cortez and for Cuban autonomy.  The Treaty of Zanjon, 
intended to end the War, confirmed nothing more than an 
armistice.   
 Succeeding the Treaty, Spain, with tariffs, wrenched 
profits from the hands' of plantation owners and virtually 
robbed food from off of the tables of the working class.  
Spain's financial reliance on the island rendered its 
population's existence nothing more than conscripts in a 
military controlled agricultural factory.  Civil rights 
became more than ever the Governor-General's prerogative.  
Unwittingly, Spain only succeeded in galvanizing Cubans 
into favoring outright independence. 
 The United States wavered between sympathy and greed.  
Rank and file Americans sympathized with Cubans and, in a 
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preponderance of cases, aided and abetted them.  The 
federal government, however, poised for opportunity 
throughout the nineteenth-century, longed to possess the 
island and, thus, deviously projected an alliance with 
Spain which all too often foiled Cuban independence 
movements.  Cubans failed in gaining their independence in 
1878 not for lack of will, but for ways and means. 
 Martí’s parents returned to Spain when he was six.  
During a half-dozen of Martí’s impressionable years he had 
witnessed Spain's intolerable treatment of Cubans and the 
unmerciful treatment of slaves.  Martí’s parents again 
relocated in Cuba before the Ten Years' War.  Martí, 
blessed with curiosity and compassion, excelled in school 
until arrested at the outbreak of the War by the Spanish on 
trumped-up charges of treason.  Spain, obviously with an 
eye upon nurturing, drew him back to the mother country for 
a university education.  But this time evil carried the 
seeds of its own destruction. 
 He returned to Cuba under Spain's general blanket of 
amnesty in 1878, a learned man devoted to Cuban 
independence.  Neither Spain nor the United States guessed 
the dimensions of Martí’s will and the potential of his 
growing, harnessed, power.  In appearance, he was a 
disarming, diminutive man, and through education, simply a 
lawyer and a poet. 
 By 1880, Martí was once again in exile.  For Cubans 
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that was a benchmark moment toward Spain's downfall.  It 
also began a reversal for whatever chance there was for the 
United States to annex the island.  Where leaders before 
Martí concentrated their efforts within, he had to 
consolidate backing beyond Cuba's borders.  He educated 
citizens and governments throughout Latin America about the 
domino effect, as he called it, if the United States 
annexed Cuba.  The consequences of annexation, he wrote, 
betokened a false democracy; the sort which bestowed 
unprecedented poverty and humiliation on the lower class, 
such as he had seen while living in the United States for 
fifteen years. 
 Martí single-handedly created the Cuban Revolutionary 
Party in 1891 while living in New York.  He proclaimed the 
Party’s aim week in and week out in its circular, Patria, 
another of Martí’s creations.  As its chief editor and 
primary reporter, he shared his philosophy as well as 
Spain's and the United States' exploits.  The paper 
circulated free of charge to hundreds of Cuban factions 
throughout a dozen countries (even secretly in Cuba), into 
thousands of homes, and readers read it aloud from the 
lectern in cigar factories, a time honored tradition.  
Anyone who desired Cuban independence, and especially those 
who did not, knew Jose Martí’s name.  He wrote and spoke 
clearly and beautifully in five languages.  Many Cubans 
considered him their Messiah. 
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 The Ten Years' War produced many Cuban military 
heroes.  The most famous were Antonio Maceo and Maximo 
Gomez.  By 1895 they were older and wiser, but also in 
exile.  Martí coaxed them from retirement.  In Patria he 
built upon their popularity, banked on their legacies, and 
bet on their futures.  Martí’s gamble paid off.  Once 
again, they proved themselves giants in 1895. 
 Martí’s own journey to the revolution in 1895 actually 
began long before 1 April, which marked the night he left 
Gomez's house and set foot on the schooner, Brothers, 
moored close to a craggy beach near Montecristi.  His 
journey did not really end when he eventually stepped from 
the rowboat onto Cuban soil on 11 April, which marked his 
first physical contact with the island in more than fifteen 
years.  Nor, when he was killed at Dos Rios on 19 May, did 
his benefaction for Cuban independence conclude, which only 
marked then the beginning of a spiritual power that proved 
far greater than his mortal contribution. 
 Frequently during his life, he rose from ashes like 
the phoenix.  When the United States derailed the 
Fernandina Plan in January of 1895, instead of abjectly 
resigning his Party's cause, Martí quickly retrenched and 
regrouped.  Stripped of funds and munitions, Martí rallied 
and proved to stalwart Cuban insurgents, already engaged in 
war with Spain on the island, that they had allies.  He 
said, by whatever means necessary, he, Gomez, and Maceo 
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would come to their aid in a rowboat.  Ironically, such was 
the dimension of his commitment, and, in reality, he 
carried out his commitment. 
 When looked at strictly in terms of time and distance 
Martí’s eleven day passage to war had its lighter moments.  
It also included a fair share of intrigue and resentment.  
Mostly, however, the journey epitomized the resilience, 
perseverance, and mettle of six dedicated Cuban 
revolutionaries.  In many instances during the journey 
Martí demonstrated he did not have the military ability of 
Gomez and others in the boat.  But Martí’s passage also 
showed that orchestrating the Cuban independence movement 
on the grand scale had little chance without him.  Martí’s 
lack of military prowess probably caused his death.  But 
his exemplary courage more than justified his title as 
General.  Jose Martí defeated the enemy.  He is the apostle 
of Cuban Independence and the memory of what he stood for 
lives throughout Latin America today, indeed, throughout 
the world.  Jose Martí was a great American. 
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